Proceedings of the 20th Monterey Workshop by Luqi et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Reports and Technical Reports Faculty and Researchers' Publications
2019-06
Proceedings of the 20th Monterey Workshop
Luqi; Boger, Dan; Paduan, Jeffrey; Dell, Robert; Dinolt,
George; Fouts, Douglas; Buettner, Raymond; Piombo,
Jessica; Miller, Scot; Newman, James...
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/62653
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.

















PROCEEDINGS OF THE 20TH MONTEREY WORKSHOP 
  Luqi, Dan Boger, Jeffrey Paduan, Robert Dell, George Dinolt, Douglas Fouts,  
  Raymond Buettner, Jessica Piombo, Scot Miller, James Newman, Ryan Kelly,  
  David Dampier, John Drummond, Valdis Berzins, Alejandro Hernandez,  
  John Monaco, Duane Davis, Nikolaj Bjørner, Douglas Lange, Brian Smith,  
  Ronald Durbin, Nicholas Weaver, Brian Noble, Stephen Hayne, Anthony Akil,  
  Sharon Runde, Shelley Gallup, William Roof, Christian Fitzpatrick,  
  Imre Balogh, Tracy Emmersen, Paul Tortora, Joseph Comey, Brian Bingham,  
  Bryan O’Halloran, Brian Wood 
June 2019 
 
DISTRIBUTION A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited. 
 


























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 
i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data 
sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other 
aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information 
Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 
30-06-2019 
2. REPORT TYPE 
Final Report 
3. DATES COVERED (From-
To) 
10/2018-09/2019 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
 










Luqi, Dan Boger, Jeffrey Paduan, Robert Dell, George Dinolt, Douglas Fouts, Raymond Buettner, 
Jessica Piombo, Scot Miller, James Newman, Ryan Kelly, David Dampier, John Drummond, 
Valdis Berzins, Alejandro Hernandez, John Monaco, Duane Davis, Nikolaj Bjørner, Douglas 
Lange, Brian Smith, Ronald Durbin, Nicholas Weaver, Brian Noble, Stephen Hayne, Anthony 
Akil, Sharon Runde, Shelley Gallup, William Roof, Christian Fitzpatrick, Imre Balogh, Tracy 
Emmersen, Paul Tortora, Joseph Comey, Brian Bingham, Bryan O’Halloran, Brian Wood 
5d. PROJECT NUMBER 
 
5e. TASK NUMBER 
 
5f. WORK UNIT 
NUMBER 
 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
1411 Cunningham Road Bldg 305 




NPS-CAG-19-001 &  
NPS-CS-19-002 










12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
DISTRIBUTION A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited.  
 
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 
The views presented in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of DoD or its components. 
 
14. ABSTRACT 
This report is the proceedings of the 20th Monterey Workshop on Cyber held at US Naval Postgraduate School in Nov. 27-29, 
2018. 
 
15. SUBJECT TERMS 
Cyber, Security, Unmanned Systems, Architectures, Hardware, Software, Machine Learning, Insider Threats, Cyber Education, 
Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence 














c. THIS PAGE 
UNCLASS 
19b. TELEPHONE 
NUMBER (include area 
code) 
831-656-2735 
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK   
 
iii 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Monterey, California 93943-5000 
 
 
Ann E. Rondeau  Steven Lerman 




The report entitled “Proceedings of the 20th Monterey Workshop” was prepared for and 
supported by the Naval Postgraduate School Research Sponsored Programs Office.  
 
Further distribution of all or part of this report is authorized. 
 
 




 Luqi, Professor 







 Peter Denning, Chairman  Dan Boger, Chairman 







 Jeffrey D. Paduan 
































The 20th Monterey Workshop on Cyber was held at the Naval Postgraduate 
School on Nov. 27-29, 2018. The NPS Provost, Cyber Academic Group Chair and Dean 
of Research chaired the workshop and led the workshop program committee with 
members from the Departments of Computer Science, Electrical and Computer 
Engineering, Information Sciences, Operations Research, and National Security Affairs. 
The workshop program consisted of five unclassified sessions, two panels, and one 
classified session. The presentation sessions addressed Cyber issues associated with 
unmanned/autonomous vehicles, Cyber challenges of Naval Operations, Cyber 
fundamentals and machine learning, and insider threats. 
The first of two workshop panels discussed establishment of the Monterey Cyber 
Institute. In the second panel on Cyber Education, panelists and attendees exchanged 
curriculum related concepts and shared teaching experiences from Cyber education 
programs at the Naval Postgraduate School, the United States Naval Academy, and the 
University of Texas at San Antonio. These are among some of the largest Cyber 
education programs in the country, with more than 4,500 students. 
One of the workshop conclusions was that Cyber education needs standardization. 
Different institutions have different views on what kind of preparation Cyber 
professionals need. These differences have to be reconciled, aligned with the needs of the 
Cyber community, and implemented at many educational institutions. There are 
accreditation bodies currently addressing these issues, and it is likely to take time for this 
process to converge on a community consensus. Related ideas that had support from the 
participants were that Cyber professionals need both theoretical understanding and hands-
on experience with Cyber operations and related tools, and that simulated Cyber 
environments had a role to play in Cyber education and training. 
It was recognized that machine learning could contribute to Cyber operations, and 
examples of such cases were presented. Cyber test facilities were described, including 
some that already have massive and growing datasets available, particularly with respect 
to autonomous vehicles. These datasets should be able to support new applications of 
machine learning in this area. There was great interest in how to check whether resulting 
 
vi 
decision aids and autonomous subsystems are safe and secure, and multiple approaches to 
this were presented. It was pointed out that due to low cost of entry, the Cyber threats 
related to autonomous vehicles are rapidly evolving and that counter-measures must 
evolve rapidly to keep up. This puts a premium on balancing risks – delay in deploying 
solutions may have risk exposure comparable to or exceeding that of deploying imperfect 
solutions rapidly. 
Another theme that emerged was how to mitigate risk posed by insider threats 
without alienating the loyal and conscientious majority of the Cyber workforce. The 
President of the United States issued an Executive Order on America’s Cyber Workforce 
On May 2, 2019, and an Executive Order on Securing the Information and 
Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain on May 15, 2019, see 
Appendices A and B. 
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From November 27-29, 2018, the Naval Postgraduate School hosted a workshop 
with attendees from academia, industry, and government to study the topic “Cyber” in 
Monterey. This workshop was the 20th in the Monterey Workshop series. Each of the 
previous workshops were focused on a specific, then-relevant topic. Details on past 
workshops can be found in Section I.D. 
A. MONTEREY WORKSHOP ON CYBER 
The Monterey Workshop on Cyber recognized that there was an urgent national 
need to provide assured and dependable software-intensive systems that can operate 
reliably in today’s contested network and computing environments. These systems and 
the personnel that develop, maintain, and use them are “a strategic asset that protects the 
American people, the homeland, and the American way of life”, as stated in the 
Presidential Executive Order 13870 reproduced in Appendix A. 
The workshop explored current capabilities and gaps related to this national need. 
Potential participants were asked to present unclassified DoD concerns to industry and 
academic minds. The best papers were selected for presentation in order to familiarize 
researchers and practitioners with stakeholders’ issues, and to help them understand the 
feasibility and limitations of current and near-future technologies.  
We emphasized interest in unmanned autonomous vehicles, managing the 
“internet of things”, future wireless communications using light (i.e., LIFI), and auto-
tagging XML data based on user behavior and heuristics. Other areas of interest included 
Cybersecurity for military operations and baseline software/hardware, unmanned/ 
autonomous systems, networked industrial control systems, and the relation between big 
data analysis and decision-making. How could machine learning, big data analysis, 
secure software/hardware architectures, AI, and other science methods enable the Cyber 
workforce to counter insider threats, integrate physical security, and conduct offensive 
Cyber operations? Is industry ready for the challenges and does it have solutions and 
tools to overcome the obstacles to secure Cyber operations? We worked together to find 
answers to questions like these in the 20th Monterey Workshop. The workshop poster is 
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shown in Figure 1.
 
Figure 1 – 20th Monterey Workshop Poster 
General Chairs: Steve Lerman, Provost 
 Dan Boger, Cyber, IS, & C4I Chair 
Program Committee Chair: Jeff Paduan, Dean of Research 
Committee Members: Douglas Fouts, Electrical & Computer Engineering 
 George Dinolt, Computer Science 
 Robert Dell, Operations Research 
 Jessica Piombo, National Security Affairs 
Local Arrangement Chair: Sharon Runde, Associate Cyber Chair 
Committee Members: LCDR Dave Couchman, US Navy 
 Andre Xie & Karen Darken, Interns 
Monterey Workshop Series Chair: Luqi, Computer Science & Cyber Group 
B. GENERAL CHAIRS’ WELCOME REMARKS 
The General Chairs, Dr. Steve Lerman, Provost of the Naval Postgraduate School 
and Prof. Dan Boger, Chair of the Cyber Academic Group, welcome you to Monterey, 
California for the 20th Monterey Workshop on Cyber. 
There is an urgent national need to provide assured and dependable software-
intensive systems that can operate dependably in today’s contested network and 
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computing environments. This workshop provides a forum for discussion and 
communication to align academic efforts with this need, and it solicits innovative 
solutions to Cyber problems that offer an achievable path to Cybersecurity assurance at 
all levels of the system. As in previous Monterey Workshops, the leading computer 
scientists, software and system engineers in government, academia, and industry are 
invited as well as Cyber agencies from around the nation. There will be both classified 
and unclassified sessions at the workshop. 
For a quarter-century, the Monterey Workshops have served as an influential 
forum for exchange of ideas and experience in software-intensive systems. Given the 
current state of industry, there are obvious challenges to fully secure functioning Cyber 
systems. This workshop provides a fantastic opportunity for all of us to work together on 
innovations for Cyber problem solving. 
C. WORKSHOP PROGRAM 
Day 1, Tuesday 11/27/2018 
08:00-08:30 Registration & Check In  
08:30-08:45 Workshop Chairs’ Remarks  
08:45-10:15 Unmanned/Autonomous Vehicles in Cyber  
 Autonomous Aerial Swam Robotics Cyber Challenges, Duane Davis, NPS  
 Mcity Autonomous Vehicle Testbed, Brian Noble, University of Michigan  
 Risks of Integrating UAS into the National Airspace System, Brian Smith, NASA 
Ames 
10:15-10:30 Break  
10:30-12:00 Unmanned/Autonomous Vehicles in Cyber - continued 
 Engineering Lightweight Autonomy, Nicholas Weaver, UC Berkeley and the 
International Computer Science Institute  
 UAV with Munition, Valdis Berzins, NPS  
 Tracking Provenance of Autonomous Decisions, Doug Lange, Space and Naval 
Warfare Systems Center 
12:00-13:00 Lunch  
13:00-14:00 Challenges of Naval Operations to Cybersecurity 
 LVC Simulation Support for the Marine Corps’ CEMOES, Chris Fitzpatrick, NPS  
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 Zero-Days, One Obligation, Anthony Akil, NPS  
14:00-15:00 Cybersecurity Architectures & Hardware 
 Continuous Monitoring, Fragility and Trust, Ron Durbin, AFIT  
 Cybersecurity Architectures and Hardware Issues, Brian Smith, NASA Ames  
15:00-15:15 Break  
15:15-16:30 Panel on Monterey Cyber Institute, Jeff Paduan (Chair), Jim Newman, Dan 
Boger, & John Drummond  
Day 2, Wednesday 11/28/18 
08:45-10:00 Cyber Fundamentals and Machine Learning 
 Fundamentals of Cybersecurity, Dave Dampier, University of Texas, San Antonio  
 NetBrane: Detecting and Protecting from DDoS Attacks, Stephen Hayne, 
Colorado State University  
10:00-10:15 Break  
10:15-12:00 Cyber Fundamentals and Machine Learning 
 Timing Side Channels Due to Human-Computer Interaction, Vinnie Monaco, 
NPS  
 AI and Safety/Security Threats, Brian Smith, NASA Ames  
 Securing & Breaking Cyber Using SMT, Nikolaj Bjørner, Microsoft  
12:00-13:00 Lunch  
13:00-14:30 Insider Threats 
 Personal Intelligence (PERSINT), William Roof, WHR  
 Self-equity - A Trustworthiness Construct, Ryan Kelly, US Army  
 Information Systems and Insider Threats, Sharon Runde, NPS  
14:30-15:00 Break  
15:00-16:30 Panel on Cyber Education and Cyber Physical Systems, Paul Tortora 
(Chair), Tracy Emmersen, Duane Davis, & Sharon Runde  
Day 3, Thursday 11/29/18 
08:30-10:00 Classified Cyber Issues in Military & Civilian Conflict  
10:00-10:15 Break  




The objective of the Monterey Workshop series since its inception has been to 
increase the practical impact of scientific methods in computer science and engineering. 
Many of the world's leading researchers have participated, and topics have included 
computer science, software and system engineering requirements and tools, innovation on 
systems, big data and cyber, and many other technical disciplines. The Workshop seeks 
to improve software practice via the application of engineering theory and to encourage 
foundational scientific results using formal methods and sound system models. 
The Monterey Workshops have been an influential forum for aligning scientific 
research and innovations among academia, industry, and government agencies since 
1992. The Workshops have developed productive research directions that have been 
adopted by various sponsors, and advanced the capabilities of various researchers. The 
titles of the past Monterey Workshops are: 
0th 1992 Concurrent and Real-Time Systems [1] 
1st 1993 Software Slicing, Merging and Integration [2] 
2nd 1994 Software Evolution [3] 
3rd 1995 Specification-Based Software Architecture [4] 
4th 1996 CAPSTAG – Computer Aided Prototyping [5] 
5th 1997 Requirements Targeting Software and Systems Engineering [6] 
6th 1998 Engineering Automation for Computer Based Systems [7] 
7th 2000 Modeling Software System Structures in a Fastly Moving Scenario [8] 
8th 2001 Engineering Automation for Software Intensive Systems Integration [9] 
9th 2002 Radical Innovations of Software and Systems Engineering in the Future [10] 
10th 2003 Software Engineering for Embedded Systems: From Requirements to 
Implementation [11] 
11th 2004 Software Engineering Tools: Compatibility and Integration [12] 
12th 2005 Networked Systems: Realization of Reliable Systems on Top of Unreliable 
Networked Platforms [13] 
13th 2006 Composition of Embedded Systems: Scientific and Industrial Issues [14] 
14th 2007 Workshop on Innovations for Requirement Analysis: From Stakeholders 
Needs to Formal Designs [15] 
15th 2008 Foundations of Computer Software, Future Trends and Techniques for 
Development [16] 
16th 2010 Modeling, Development and Verification of Adaptive Computer Systems: the 
Grand Challenge for Robust Software [17] 
17th 2012 Development, Operation and Management of Large-Scale Complex IT 
Systems [18] 
18th 2016/Feb. Integrity of Industrial Control System & Future Command & Control [19] 
19th 2016/Oct. Challenges and Opportunity with Big Data [20] 
20th 2018 20th Monterey Workshop on Cyber 
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The Monterey Workshops have always focused on areas at the edge of the state of 
the art with potential for improvements that will shift the entire paradigm. Suggestions 
regarding the most important next step forward are always welcome. For further 
information on the workshop series, see the Monterey Workshop websites [21]. 
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II. UNMANNED/AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 
Many of the workshop participants were concerned with Cyber aspects of 
unmanned and autonomous vehicles [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27]. The first presentation 
by Brian Noble explained the work of the Mcity Autonomous Vehicle Testbed at the 
University of Michigan. Brian Smith’s presentation laid out the potential risks posed by 
the integration of machine learning and AI into the aviation industry. The third 
presentation by Nicholas Weaver explained his work on developing a cheap and effective 
anti-drone drone. The fourth presentation by Valdis Berzins examined how risk-based 
testing could be applied to autonomous vehicles that operate in contested Cyber 
environments. The fifth presentation by Doug Lange studied the necessity of tracking the 
provenance of autonomous decisions. The sixth presentation by Duane Davis studied the 
challenges inherent to operating swarms of UAVs. This session was chaired first by 
Bryan O’Halloran and then by Brian Bingham. 
A. MCITY AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TESTBED 
Presenter: Brian Noble, University of Michigan 
1. Summary 
The Mcity Autonomous Vehicle Testbed is a public-private partnership for 
vehicle testing and pre-competitive research. This facility has conducted 3,500+ hours of 
testing in a virtual environment using simulation tools. It operates the largest Dedicated 
Short-Range Communication (DSRC) fleet in the United States. The project has found 
that an augmented reality environment speeds testing and deployment. This allowed the 
project to deploy a Level-4 Connected and Automated Vehicle (CAV) on the campus of 
the University of Michigan. The project developed V2V support for autonomy using the 
OpenCAV platform with Hybrid Lincoln MKZs (NAVYA, open source, Lincoln & Kia), 
and identified four key trends in personal mobility, as shown in Figure 28. 
The project recommends that vendors participate in pre-competitive research, 
explore user behavior and trust, share in datasets and tools, leverage significant existing 




Figure 2 - Key Trends in Personal Mobility 
2. Facilities 
The Mcity consortium provides a unique combination of research, laboratories, 
and education as shown in Figure 39. 
 
Figure 3 - The Mcity Consortium 
Features of the Mcity test facility are shown in Figure 410. The objectives of the 
test facility are to provide an augmented reality environment for CAVs, an Accelerated 
Evaluation Model and test protocol for AVs, and an implementation of 5G for CAV 
research. This will enable rapid learning in real-time and speed AV innovation, as well as 
reducing development costs. 
The objectives of the Living Labs are to provide a certified DSRC sustainable test 
environment with 2500 vehicles and 60 intersections, and to deploy two Level 4 CAVs to 
serve the community. This provides a reference for national testing and market 
deployment for partners, as well as enabling fast prototyping of V2V and V2I 
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applications, optimization of complementary forms of CV technology, gaining early 
insights, and removal of CAV deployment barriers. Pictures of the driverless shuttles 
developed by Mcity are shown in Figure 511. 
 
Figure 4 - Mcity Test Facilities 
 
Figure 5 - Mcity Driverless Shuttles 
3. Research 
The barriers to CAV deployment that the project identified include: 
 User trust & acceptance 
 Legal, liability & insurance 
 Market adoption 
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 Privacy and security 
 AV testing and evaluation 
The insights the project gained are related to: 
 Societal impact, energy, safety, etc. 
 Connectivity enabled AV 
 New business models 
The benefits of V2V communication are illustrated in Figure 612. The car shown 
in the foreground is stopped in the middle of the road, out of sight around a blind turn. 
 
Figure 6 - How V2V Helps Automated Vehicles 
The project also conducted research to understand user behavior and trust. A map 




Figure 7 - Understanding User Behavior and Trust 
The OpenCAV platform used in this test is a modified Lincoln MKZ (hybrid). A 
diagram of the modifications made is shown in Figure 814. 
 
Figure 8 - The OpenCAV Platform 
The MKZs used in the tests had the driver and passenger seats reversed. The test 
subject, simulating a user of an autonomous vehicle, was seated in the left-front seat and 
wore various physiological sensors. A researcher sat in the back seat to monitor the 
results. The car was then driven around while the test subject operated a tablet device. 
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These tests were conducted with a diverse range of test subjects who differed in gender 
and ethnicity. 
Another objective of the research was to create a CAV database, which included: 
 Blind Spot Monitor (BSM), Signal Phase and Timing (SPAT), environmental 
 Labeled images, pedestrian kinematic data 
 Energy and trip datasets 
 CAV deployment data [user behavior, edge cases] 
 Near-real-time CV data dashboard [AA – Plymouth Rd. corridor] 
This allowed the project to discover value in CV data, such as: 
 Measurable safety benefits 
 Trip information 
 Human driving behavior 
 Congestion management 
 New business models 
In addition, the database gave us early insights into AV development, 
deployment, and impacts. Current and planned datasets are shown in Figure 915. 
 
Figure 9 - Mcity Datasets & Tools 
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The Navya shuttle dataset was initiated on June 4th, 2018, from two shuttles 
running Monday to Friday, 9AM to 3PM. Over 1000 trips carried hundreds of passengers 
and generated more than 200 hours of data. The initial dataset released in early August 
covered 200 trips and included exterior camera video. The full dataset includes a trip 
summary, GPS detail data, inertial measurements, Mobileye primary target information 
and counts, forward/rear video, and a data dictionary. Planned future datasets include: 
 Mcity LIDAR data – Driving LIDAR data from Mcity, multiple passes, multiple 
routes 
 Mcity Point Cloud – Fixed LIDAR scan point cloud  
 Mighty AI – Thousands of labeled images 
 AACVTE – Additional Safety Pilot dataset 
 Track Data Capture - Recorded at Mcity during Track rental 
4. Consortium Structure 
The consortium consisted of a leadership circle and an affiliate program. The 
leadership circle is explained in Figure 1016, and the affiliate program in Figure 1117. 
 




Figure 11 - Mcity Affiliate Program 
5. Findings 
The project encountered both structural and technical issues. These are 
summarized in Figure 1218 and Figure 1319, respectively. 
 




Figure 13 - Technical Issues 
B. RISKS OF INTEGRATING UAS INTO THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE 
SYSTEM 
Presenter: Brian Smith, NASA Ames Research Center, NASA Airspace Operations and 
Safety Program (AOSP) 
1. Summary 
In the short-term, the project sought to identify practical safety/security risks in 
deploying machine learning systems, e.g., data poisoning, training set inference, lack of 
model interpretability, and undesirable model bias. In the mid-term, the project assessed 
potential safety/security risks of future AI systems that are more powerful and more 
broadly deployed than those used today. Relevant problems in this space include scalably 
specifying and supervising reward-based learning, preventing unwanted side effects, 
generalizing out of domain, and ensuring that systems remain under control. In the long-
term, the project will conduct theoretical work addressing the risks posed by artificially 
engineered (super) intelligences. Specifically, how we might ensure that a system is 
aligned with our values, and propose procedures for conserving this alignment while 
supporting recursive self-improvement? 
The project found that AI solutions exist within set rules that are explicitly 
defined. Few AI security solutions "fail” their set rules. They can be made reliable. If 
anything, one needs to identify the holes/gaps/assumptions present in the explicit set of 
rules defined for a security task, including the specifications/behavior of the 
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environments that these AI systems are grown to work in and the 
completeness/correctness of the rules/cost functions that these AI systems are supposed 
to meet. 
The project recommends using AI in the threat development landscape as a means 
to test out safety/security systems as well as utilizing AI to generate a wide range of risk 
scenarios that could breach security and safety protocols. AI might become one basis to 
provide the harshest of tests. 
2. Background 
As a result of the highest level of safety standards and risk management, aviation 
is the safest mode of transportation – a so-called “ultra-safe (and mostly secure) socio-
technical system.” The validation process of initial implementations for machine 
intelligence in aviation had to be rigorous, so not all early attempts were successful. It 
had to be proven that AI: 
1) Operates safely. 
2) Is interoperable with the current system. 
3) Supports the human-centric system. 
4) Is applied through smooth and stable transition in a globally harmonized manner. 
The key to achieving well-guided AI is to establish a human-machine coexisting 
environment, where the machine becomes a ‘sidekick’ that supports humans, instead of 
being a prospective ‘rival’. While early automation was providing support with simple 
and repetitive tasks, today AI is expected to deliver further capabilities by learning and 
mimicking human behaviors. AI is carrying out human tasks and in certain cases, even 
out-performing them. This can be achieved from the data, which fuels AI. The industry 
has already worked to build the cornerstone for AI, and with open data sharing, AI could 
change how we make decisions. The question remains, however: could AI learn and 
mimic nefarious human behaviors? 
 The project identified three problems in the short-, mid-, and long-term 
timeframes. 
 Short-term: Identifying practical safety/security risks in deploying machine 
learning systems, such as data poisoning, training set inference, lack of model 
interpretability, and undesirable model bias. 
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 Mid-term: Assessing potential safety/security risks of future AI systems that are 
more powerful and more broadly deployed than those used today. Relevant 
problems in this space include scalably specifying and supervising reward-based 
learning, preventing unwanted side effects, generalizing out of domain, and 
ensuring that systems remain under control. 
 Long-term: Theoretical work addressing the risks posed by artificially engineered 
(super)intelligences, i.e., How we might ensure that a system is aligned with our 
values, and propose procedures for conserving this alignment while supporting 
recursive self-improvement in security? 
Other challenges for AI and security include assembling large quantities of high-
quality labeled data that characterize both normal operations and the threat environment. 
If false cues can be eliminated by careful, comprehensive labeling, then we will be able 
to use deep learning methods to detect emerging threats and trends. Unfortunately, 
labeling isn’t easy and requires domain expertise. Another challenge is achieving a 
breadth of detection capability. In the physical security realm, screening systems need to 
be able to detect and differentiate knives, bottles, batteries, cash and potential IED 
devices. What is the breadth of Cyber threats deep learning systems must reliably detect? 
These and other challenges are shown in Figure 1420. 
 
Figure 14 - Myriad AI Security Challenges 
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Additionally, AI/machine learning systems need to have anomaly-detection skills 
at least on a par with human operators. Automated anomaly detection is a tough nut to 
crack, and developers of AI systems shouldn’t be trusted to test and validate their 
systems. Only those with “skin in the game” – that is, the front-line operators – should 
test and validate. Machines are best at performing repetitive tasks, analyzing huge 
datasets, and handling routine cases. Humans, on the other hand, are good at resolving 
ambiguous information, exercising judgment, and dealing with end users. 
There are four phases of AI classification/labeling. 
1) Training or “learning” phase in which the analyst constructs a model by applying 
a classifier to a set of training data. 
2) Validation phase in which the analyst applies the model to a validation dataset in 
order to assess its accuracy. 
3) Testing phase to assess the model’s accuracy with test data that was withheld 
from the training and validation processes. 
4) Deployment phase, in which the model is applied to predict the class membership 
of new, unlabeled data. 
In practice, an analyst may train and test multiple models using different 
algorithms and hyperparameter settings. Then, they can compare the models and choose 
the one that offers the optimal combination of accuracy and detection rate for security 
anomaly detection. 
Market trends in areas such as autonomous ground and aerial vehicles, strongly 
suggest that many future safety/security-critical systems will be comprised of 
heterogeneous, dynamic coalitions of systems of systems. For these types of systems, it is 
crucial to develop sound strategies that would allow security assurance and certification 
to be done compositionally. The new characteristics of safety-critical systems, such as 
connectivity, autonomy, and other cyber-physical properties, make assurance more 
challenging. It is not possible anymore to assure a system is dealing only with safety; 
other qualitative concerns must be addressed, e.g., security. 
 What new ideas may be out there on compositional, evolutionary, and multi-
concern assurance and certification of safety/security-critical systems? 
 Is there room for reuse, composition, and combination of AI-based assurance 
arguments, assurance evidence, and contextual information about safety/security-
critical products, in a way that makes assurance and certification more cost-
effective, precise, and scalable? 
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The potential in applying machine learning algorithms that exist today to the data 
and logs that Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) engines collect is 
immense. AI could reason over the data at global scale in near real-time using the cloud 
and produce attack scenarios, which you could then tie to a security operations tool that 
automates the response and defenses based on the outcome of the AI reasoning – making 
sense of signal and intelligence. With a large volume of globally sourced data, you could 
use AI to look at anomalies in the behavior patterns of humans, devices, data, and 
applications at scale and make accurate predictions of the security threats to your 
enterprise—allowing you to deploy defenses well in advance of a specific attack. The 
attack surface is rapidly growing, the bad actors are becoming more sophisticated, and 
the need for tool evolution is compelling. AI is a path to that evolution or at a minimum 
keeping up with bad actors. 
3. Findings and Recommendations 
The project found that AI solutions exist within the set of rules that are explicitly 
defined. Few AI security solutions "fail” the set of rules, because they can be made 
reliable. If anything, one needs to identify the holes/gaps/assumptions present in the 
explicit set of rules defined for a security task, including the specifications/behavior of 
the operational environments that these AI systems are designed to work in. 
Cybersecurity systems designers and front-line operators perform work in the four 
domains illustrated in Figure 1521. As the figure shows, the four domains do not 
coincide, even though most people expect that they are the same. 
The project recommends that users leverage AI’s ability to allow more robust 
device-related IoT malfunction detection, sophisticated malware detection, and 
improvements in vulnerability management. The industry needs to work towards finding 
the sweet-spot between unsupervised and supervised machine learning so that we can 
fully benefit from our knowledge of current threat types and vectors and combine that 
with the ability to detect new attacks and uncover new vulnerabilities. Much like AI, 
machine learning in threat hunting must be guided by humans. Human researchers are 
able to look beyond the anomalies that the machine may pick up and put context around 
the security situation to decide if a suspected attack is truly taking place. Users should 
also consider using AI in the threat development landscape as a means to test out 
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safety/security systems, as well as utilize AI to generate a wide range of risk scenarios 
that could breach security and safety protocols. AI might become one basis to provide the 
harshest of penetration tests. 
 
Figure 15 - Four Domains 
C. ENGINEERING LIGHTWEIGHT AUTONOMY 
Presenter: Nicholas Weaver, UC Berkeley, International Computer Science Institute 
1. Summary 
The project defined three problems regarding developing autonomous drones to 
hunt other drones: 
1) How light and cheap can one build a control system for autonomous drones? 
2) Is there sufficient processing for on-board image processing? 
3) Can one utilize the "Race drone" ecology? 
The project found that control computers can be very light, around 20g and <$400 
in low volume production, with two 1080p cameras (each under $30). These can be quite 
capable, with a dual core ARM, significant FPGA, ½ GB DRAM, two IMUs, GPS, 
WiFi/Bluetooth, and an SD card. Commercial racing drones are cheap, powerful, and 
amazingly capable. Light-weight autonomy is coming: it is time to be prepared to deal 
with the coming storm of small, light, cheap, and deadly autonomous threats. 
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2. Background & Requirements 
Drones have a large potential for malicious use. This project, which was a side 
project in addition to the researcher’s other work, sought to build a drone to hunt other 
drones. The concept was to deploy a "weaponized-party-popper" or "streamer" a few cm 
above a hostile drone: This streamer would then entangle props and the target drone 
would crash. The requirements were as follows: 
Low cost: <$1000/each flyaway 
Autonomous: Can't work with a human in the loop 
Self-contained: Communications are unreliable 
The project focused on building the computing hardware and software necessary 
to automate existing commercial drones. These needed the same (or greater) agility and 
mobility as potential target drones. 
3. Development 
The project chose commercial racing drones as the platform for development. 
Quad-copter racing drones can fly at speeds up to 150 kph (93 mph) and are agile enough 
to fly under trees and through abandoned buildings. These can easily carry a 200g (7 oz) 
payload with 5+ minutes of endurance. Fixed-wing drones have an endurance of about 45 
minutes and have a level flight speed ranging from 75 to 150kph (47-93 mph). Both kinds 
of drones have plenty of on-board power for electronics and can be purchased for around 
$300 dollars. They are designed around modular hardware, software, and 
communications protocols. Examples of both types are shown in Figure 1622. 
 
Figure 16 - Commercial Racing Drones 
In order to make the drones autonomous, the project developed a custom control 




Figure 17 - Kestrel Control Board 
The envisioned drones would be equipped with two cameras. One camera would 
be used for flight navigation, and would be forward mounted with a narrow field of view. 
The FPGA would perform edge detection and optical flow for obstacle avoidance. The 
other camera would be used for hunting other drones, and would have a wide fish-eye 
lens with a top-angle mount. The software would request either a low-resolution view or 
full resolution around a point on a frame-by-frame basis in order to both mimic predator 
behavior and eliminate the need to write to main memory. The FPGA would undistort the 
fisheye and write directly into processor cache, and the software could then evaluate 15 
targets/second in a "scan/focus/scan" loop. The host processer would run Linux, and 
anything real-time on a dedicated soft-core in the FPGA. 
Currently, the hardware is done, but not debugged. 
 Not yet booting to Linux: 
Debugging has been a low priority since this is a side project 
 ~$13k for prototypes (x5) 
 Quote for <$500/board for quantity 100 
 Probably will do a spin with an extra 5mm on the bottom to add a bunch of 
general purpose I/O and upgrade the FPGA to a 7Z020 
 8-layer full-custom board design 
o Personal design, fabricated & 
assembled by Sierra Circuits 
 Xilinx Zynq 7Z010 FPGA/processor 
o ½ GB DDR3 DRAM, SD card, 
WiFi/Bluetooth 
 2x Raspberry Pi-0 MIPI-CSI2 Camera 
Interfaces 
o Cameras at 1080p/30fps/$15 
 GPS, 2x MEMS IMUs 
 30.5mm x 30.5mm race-drone mount, 
~20g mass 
o power supply accepts unregulated 
race-drone battery connections 
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The Software/FPGA logic is envisioned but not implemented. The goal is to steal 
as much existing infrastructure as possible, e.g., PYNQ Linux stack for host 
software/interfacing. 
4. Conclusions and Implications 
Firstly, this is only a side project. If the research can accomplish this as a ~20% 
project with no other support but a little unrestricted fund pool, what could be done if a 
researcher was full time on this and had a few minions? Second, this level of computation 
is available at this very moment. Both a GPU or FPGA can be used for real-time image 
processing from very low cost cameras, and these can be coupled to general purpose CPU 
for higher level decision making. 
Additionally, an anti-drone drone is inherently an offensive drone. The only 
difference is target selection and payload. Autonomy also changes potential defenses. 
 Remote control: Jam the drone and it dies 
 Used very successfully against ISIS drones and probably also in Venezuela 
 Autonomy: Human control can be negative control 
 Drone goes into "Kill All Humans" mode to complete its mission 
Despite the relatively light payload of 200g (7 oz), this can be quite worrying to 
defense planners when integrated in an autonomous race drone. A 40mm grenade weighs 
about 200g (7 oz) and has a 5m (16’) kill radius. Even worse, stacked munition guns 
would weigh ~100g (3.5 oz). A carbon fiber barrel with internal rifled steel sleeve could 
have six stacked 9mm hollow-point rounds built into the barrel, like a miniaturized 
MetalStorm gun. Two barrels can be mounted side-by side, and computer control means 
6-12 potential headshots. A potential autonomous drone system is explained in Figure 
1824. Of particular concern is “Spirit of Butts Farm” strategies, which showed that it is 




Figure 18 - Drone Carrier System 
Within the next couple years, there will be a tipping point on autonomous drones. 
Defenses are needed across a broad spectrum, containing aerial attackers as well as 
“ankle-biters” (small autonomous ground vehicles with a jump ability). $100k or $100M 
systems cannot be efficiently be used to stop $1000 threats. 
D. UAV WITH MUNITION 
Presenter: Valdis Berzins, Naval Postgraduate School, Computer Science Department & 
Andy Hernandez, Naval Postgraduate School, Systems Engineering Department 
1. Summary 
The project sought to find out how risk-based testing can be applied to 
autonomous vehicles that operate in contested Cyber environments. The project 
determined that the number of test cases needed to achieve confidence that the failure rate 
is less than the tolerance can be derived from maximum acceptable risk level. Risks must 
be reformulated in game theoretic terms for contested Cyber environments. The project 
recommends that testing be augmented with appropriate static analysis and the largest 
effort be allocated to mitigate hazards with the most severe consequences. Adversary 
capability to modify UAV control code carries maximal risk – severity of consequences 




Cyber Physical Systems are engineered systems comprised of interacting physical 
and computational components. Drone technologies are primary examples of this kind of 
system. There has been a recent explosive growth in unmanned aircraft, as they are not 
limited by human performance or physiological characteristics, they offer extreme 
persistence and maneuverability, and they present alternatives as stand-alone or 
embedded options for military forces. The success of an unmanned aircraft system 
depends on how it can overcome possible technical and software faults and failures and 
meet the desired design-requirements. Developers focus on the safety and reliability 
aspects of the system and software development processes used for drones, but they must 
mitigate risk where DoD considers that Risk = F(Severity, Probability). 
For systems with high reliability, it is unaffordable and/or impractical to collect 
enough observations during tests to compute accurate estimates of failure probability. 
This project sought to develop a risk assessment methodology for drone software using a 
real time monitoring architecture. Specifically, 
 What will be a proper/appropriate methodology for the assessment of software 
risk in a weapons system drone? 
 What will be a proper methodology to mitigate the risk of software failure in a 
drone’s system? 
Our solution was to develop a method for bounding software failure probabilities 
to high levels of statistical confidence via automated testing. 
In an operational context, drones perform intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance missions while a ground control station and operators direct UAV 
activities through different wireless links. Regression testing should be considered in 
cases where 
1) Neither specifications nor code of a software module has changes from a previous 
release, but the hardware has changed. 
2) The specifications have not changed, but the implementation of the code has 
changed. 
3. Brief Discussion of Reliability Analysis 
There are two approaches to assessing reliability; a bottom up approach called 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and a top down approach called Fault Tree 




Figure 19 - FTA vs. FMEA 
FMEA predicts failures and their effects, predicts potential cause(s) of failure 
modes, and judges sufficiency of measures already taken. FMEA provides a means to 
assess the adequacy of measures to prevent harmful failure modes and to check reliability 
of the design (and operations). A failure is defined as either: 
 Non-function: no performance 
 Malfunction: wrong performance or performance of insufficient quality 
 expected, but erratic or too slow 
 unexpected  
Reliability is defined as the performance and quality of a product or a process that 
can maintain the intended functions under specific conditions and within a prescribed 
period. 




Figure 20 - Scoring in FMEA 
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An example of Failure Model Effects and Analysis is shown in Figure 2127. 
 
Figure 21 - FMEA Example 
FTA enumerates different ways in which a failure can occur and its probability of 
occurrence. It starts with identifying a specific, top-level event (e.g., “system catches 
fire”), and then constructing a top-down causal hierarchy for each top-level event. Then, 
going from the bottom up, the probability of all input events is determined and rolled up 
to obtain an overall reliability of each top-level event. If the calculated top-level 
reliability is unacceptable, corrective action is required. An example of Fault Tree 




Figure 22 - FTA Example 
4. Bounding Method (Drone Case Study) 
A case study was conducted to apply the proposed method to a commercial quad-
rotor Parrot AR.Drone 2.0. This drone is controlled via WiFi using Apple, Android 
device, or PC, and has advanced features including image recognition. The drone is 
shown in two configurations in Figure 2329. 
 
Figure 23 - Parrot Ar.Drone 2.0 
Hazards to the drone that were analyzed in the case study were: 
1) Loss of communication 
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2) Loss of propulsion 
3) Environmental Damage 
4) Loss of battery power 
5) Loss of situational awareness 
The severity and probability matrices for the risk analysis are shown in Figure 
2430. 
 
Figure 24 - Severity and Probability Matrices 




Figure 25 - Mishap Categories 
Combining these failure modes with estimates of their probability of occurrence 
per the FTA in Figure 2632, the overall the risk for the loss of communication is assessed 
as high. The system risk is displayed in Figure 2733. 
 
Figure 26 - Fault Tree for Communication Loss 
 
Figure 27 – Results of FTA for the Parrot Drone 
The proposed method for determining the number of test cases needed (N) is 
outlined as follows. First the tolerance level for residual risk exposure must be 
determined. Then a risk budget must be allocated and the severity of consequences is 
determined for each hazard. The maximum acceptable probability of occurrence is then 
found be using the risk matrix backwards, looking up the worst acceptable probability of 
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occurrence within the given severity and risk budget. Then the number test cases needed 
are determined where: 
 Worst acceptable probability of occurrence is 1/N, 
 Want confidence 1 - 1/N that failure rate < 1/N, 
 Need N ln N test cases with no failures observed, where ln denotes natural 
logarithm. 
If the test passes, the risk due to software failure will meet the risk budget with 
the specified confidence level. 
In an operational context, Cyber risks are different because there is an intelligent 
adversary. In this situation the probability of occurring is not constant and depends on the 
state – e.g., are we at war? The probability of attack can change drastically without 
warning, as happened just before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The very concept 
of risk needs rethinking for contested environments. While traditional statistical methods 
are sensible for random failures (minimizing expected loss), game theoretic ideas may 
better match the (cyber-) conflict context by minimizing worst-case loss [28]. While 
mitigating the worst possible case might be wasteful, planning using probabilities typical 
of peacetime is short-sighted. It may appear seductive due to minimizing short-term 
costs, but it may not mitigate exposure to catastrophic events that are improbable in 
peacetime but frequent under conflict conditions. Some surrogates for probability of 
occurrence that may be applicable in contested environments include degree of legal 
liability, cost, and technical difficultly of exploiting a vulnerability. 
5. Conclusions 
This study performs a hierarchical top-down decomposition of drone control 
systems into their software components, analyzing them in terms of features and 
functions, explaining how they interact with each other, and develops a high level 
analysis-prototyping design for the assessment of software risk in several types of drones 
including a weapon system drone. Our method gets around the difficulty of testing 
systems with high reliability (hence low failure rate) by focusing on obtaining a statistical 
upper bound on the failure rate, without seeking to determine its exact value. Such a 
bound can be obtained from a sufficiently large number of test observations that are 
completely failure-free. For Cyber, testing must be augmented with static analysis, e.g., 
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monitoring the statement coverage of the test cases, plus reachability analysis for 
reachable untested code, plus human inspection of untested code if coverage is less than 
100%. 
E. TRACKING PROVENANCE OF AUTONOMOUS DECISIONS 
Presenter: Doug Lange, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, Naval Information 
Warfare Center Pacific 
1. Summary 
The addition of autonomy into systems necessitates the use of methods that 
inform human decision makers concerning automated decisions. Provenance analysis can 
be used to provide human-comprehendible explanations of decisions made by 
autonomous components. We have reason to believe that we can utilize provenance data 
to provide summaries of activity and learn to recognize the quality of decision processes. 
Systems should be instrumented to track provenance, and we must then make use of the 
data to learn to model the quality of decisions. 
2. Introduction 
In the context of autonomous systems, provenance is information about entities, 
activities, agents, and the relationships between these concepts. It introduces methods of 
tracing decisions made to decision makers and the information available to them at the 
time. Analysis of these relationships can bring transparency of the decision-making 
process to humans, particularly to those responsible for the quality of the outcomes. This 
information is important in military operations and Command and Control (C2), 
especially when autonomous artificial agents influence the decision-making process. The 
Provenance Data Model (PROV-DM) is a generic data model that allows for domain and 
application-specific representations of provenance data to be translated and interchanged 




Figure 28 - Provenance Model Key 
3. Background and Motivation 
As noted in the Association for Computing Machinery US Public Policy Council 
(USACM) statement on algorithmic transparency and accountability [30], “Computer 
algorithms are widely employed throughout our economy and society to make decisions 
that have far-reaching impacts, including their applications for education, access to credit, 
healthcare, and employment.” This makes ethical concerns around algorithms and 
Human-Autonomy Teaming (HAT) a very important issue, especially since even a well-
designed computer system can have unexpected outcomes, biases, or errors. Provenance 
analytics is commonly used in algorithmically intensive systems such as crowdsourcing 
apps, but is also used in anomaly detection, accountability and trust. Some ethical aspects 
of HAT can be directly addressed by data provenance. 
4. Intelligent Multi-UxV Planner with Adaptive Collaborative/Control 
Technologies (IMPACT) 
In the near term, critical systems will not be completely autonomous, but rather 
will consist of humans interacting with autonomous subsystems. An example of this kind 
of Human-Autonomy teaming is the Intelligent Multi-UxV Planner with Adaptive 
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Collaborative/Control Technologies Project. An envisioned interface for the IMPACT 
system is shown in Figure 2935. 
 
Figure 29 – IMPACT Interface Mockup 
The Human Autonomy Interface allows for play calling, tailoring, monitoring, 
and enhanced operator-autonomy dialog. A play is a tactic or course of action for 
accomplishing a desired objective. A Resource Allocation Agent recommends assets for a 
desired play, monitors progress across plays, and identifies targets of opportunity. 
Collaborative Control Algorithms (CCA) dynamically interact with Agents to produce 
effective mission routing while the Task Manager assists by dynamically balancing the 
system workload. Essentially, this allows a human operator to control an autonomous 
system like a coach controls an American football team, calling different plays depending 
on the assets available and the current situation. Figure 30 shows a diagram of an 





Figure 30 - MAPLE FLAG IMPACT System 
The human playcalling can be understood by following the activities (blue 
rectangles) going from top to bottom in Figure 3137. A task is generated from a message 
received, and constraints are made alongside the task itself. The operator selects a play 
from the playbook, or from another source such as the Task Manager. Constraints are 
derived from the type of play the operator selects, constraints can be amended by humans 
or automated agents, and planning begins. Planning produces different options (policies 
are also checked, but not shown in the diagram), and the one selected by the operator will 




Figure 31 - Detailed IMPACT Diagram 
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Due to the complex web of relations and dependencies within this system, a small 
change in elements “higher up the chain” can lead to wildly divergent outcomes and 
effects. This is shown in Figure 3238, where a dependency is changed partway through 
the planning process. In Box A, the process starts out the same as a human playcall when 
a chat message causes a new task and task constraints to be created. The rest of the 
provenance records events up to the point where a final plan is instantiated. Box B shows 
that instantiated final plan, and a new chat message changing the dependency. This takes 
the final plan and puts it through a new planning process. The new task caused by the 
chat message is taken through the entire planning process again and finally re-instantiated 
when the human operator decides to act upon new intel.  
 
Figure 32 - Dependency Change 
Although provenance analysis allows operators to trace the chain of causality of 
an event back to its source or nucleus, it can still be difficult to turn the raw data 
generated by provenance analysis into a coherent explanation of the actions of an 






developed to study computer based text generation, can be applied. The most important 
part of a text, called the “nucleus”, is identified along with its relationships to other 
elements of the text. By replacing the nucleus of a text with the “source” of an 
autonomous action, RST can easily be applied to explain why an autonomous system 
took the action it did. An example RST diagram is shown in Figure 3339. 
 
Figure 33 - Example RST Diagram 
An additional layer of complexity is required to account for anomalies, i.e., an 
asset straying out of communications range. Figure 3440 shows a provenance diagram 
dealing with this event. When a plan has been set into motion, the "policy_monitor" agent 
detects when an asset will potentially violate a policy (asset must be within comm range) 
and the planner begins planning to correct the impending violation. After validating that 
the new plan option is ok, the new plan is selected by an autonomous agent (usually Plan 
Monitor) shown here as "operator." This plan will be finalized by the planner once again 




Figure 34 – Anomaly (Policy Violation) 
5. Conclusions and Further Work 
Provenance-enabling and analytics could serve as useful tools in Command and 
Control and Human-Autonomy Teaming, especially with regard to UxVs. Provenance 
services and capabilities have been implemented in Allied IMPACT, and the combination 
of provenance analysis and Rhetorical Structure Theory can be used to generate 
compelling and coherent explanations for the actions of complex autonomous systems. 
Future work may include learning to characterize and classify the quality of a 
planning evolution, assigning responsibility for particular decisions to particular agents or 
teams to illuminate risk to decision makers, and summarizing complex composite 
decisions at appropriate levels of abstraction for information decision makers. We also 
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suggest expanding UML2PROV and attempting to automatically generate PROV-
Templates with other modeling languages, as well as expanding the instrumentation of 
autonomic frameworks and other autonomous decision frameworks. 
F. AUTONOMOUS AERIAL SWARM ROBOTICS CYBER CHALLENGES 
Presenter: Duane Davis, Naval Postgraduate School, Advanced Robotic Systems 
Engineering Laboratory (ARSENL) 
1. Summary 
Problem Description: Simultaneous operation of large teams of small (non-
program of record) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) presents Cyber challenges that have 
not been adequately addressed or characterized. 
Observations: 
Cybersecurity issues can be grouped by the part of the system that they affect: 
6) Communications & networking 
7) Ground control stations 
8) Mission-level autonomy 
9) Autopilot & flight control 
Most issues are not unique to UAV systems. 
Recommendations: 
1) “Best practices” address many UAS system Cyber issues 
2) Consider UAS Cyber requirements holistically rather than in isolation 
3) Base UAS Cyber requirements on risk rather than arbitrary rules 
2. Introduction 
This section describes a research project called ARSENL. The vision behind 
ARSENL is to provide a diverse academic and research venue to foster a holistic, 
multidisciplinary approach to the design, employment, and future concept development 
of robotic and unmanned systems. The emphasis of this project has been to explore the 
use of swarms of UAVs to perform coordinated missions. 
All of the platforms used in this research were small and relatively inexpensive. 
These types of platforms were chosen to enable the project to acquire sufficient numbers 
of them in order to conduct meaningful experiments with swarms and the coordination of 




Figure 35 - ARSENL Platforms 
The project has leveraged open-source and open architecture hardware, designs, 
and commercial components to speed up development, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 36 - Leveraging Open-source and COTS 
The experiments typically involve multiple swarms, sometimes adversarial. 




Figure 37 - ARSENL Multi-UAV System Architecture 
3. Cyber Issues Studied 
The first Cyber issue studied was communications and networking. 
Communications involving UAV swarms typically have the following characteristics: 
 Broadcast or mesh (MANET) protocols 
 Lossy and disconnected networks (reliability vs latency tradeoffs) 
 Usually low power & line-of-sight 
 COTS systems frequently use proprietary protocols 
 Custom-developed systems are implemented on top of standard protocols 
Communications reliability is often spotty, as show in Figure 38Figure 4. The 
figure illustrates the quality of the signal form the transmitting sortie to the receiving 
sortie using a graphical representation where green means the signal is good and red 




Figure 38 - Typical air-to-air broadcast communications reliability 
The project’s analysis showed that the swarm communications are: 
 Susceptible to denial (jamming, flooding, etc.) 
 Cybersecurity issues of well-known protocols are addressable 
 Privacy is an encryption issue 
 Integrity can be achieved with MACs or signatures 
 Cybersecurity issues of proprietary protocols can be problematic 
 Does it have the required capabilities? 
 What level of trust does it merit? 
 Do we have the specifications? 
 Is it configurable? 
 Etc. 
To resolve these issues, we recommend that swarms: 
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 Require isolation 
 May or may not be reasonable (or even possible) 
 Utilize “best practices” with standard protocols 
 Develop assessment criteria for proprietary protocols 
 Will provide a basis for informed decisions 
 Decrease vulnerability to denial attacks with failsafes 
 EMMW? Maybe, for programs of record 
 Hard for custom systems 
 Probably impossible for COTS 
The second Cyber issue studied was associated with the Ground Control Stations 
(GCSs). The GCSs of commercial UAVs typically have the following characteristics: 
 COTS systems often have proprietary GCSs 
 Include both hardware and software 
 Limited end-user configurability 
 Custom systems can rely on open-source or in-house development 
 Typically run on Windows, MacOS, or Linux systems 
 Both types of systems rely on the underlying communications infrastructure and 
may or may not require at least sporadic Internet connectivity 
An example GCS interface is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 39 - Example GCS Interface 
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The project’s analysis showed typical GCSs have the following characteristics 
and issues: 
 COTS system GCSs 
 Depend on vendor trust (intent & competence) 
 Cyber assessment may or may not be adequate 
 Hardware and software both require evaluation 
 Open source systems 
 Low likelihood of malicious intent 
 Cyber vulnerabilities may be present 
 Community alignment with DoD objectives & priorities 
 Trustworthiness of maintenance processes 
 Custom systems 
 Correctness was more relevant than security 
 Insider threat? (intent & competence) 
 OS security requirements may not be standardized 
To address these issues, we recommend that GCSs: 
 Utilize “best practices” on host systems 
 Systems should be assessed in the same manner as other (non-UAS) systems 
 Host versus application vulnerabilities 
 Formalize the assessment process 
 What are the requirements? 
 What are the assessment criteria? 
 Open source versus in-house development versus a little of both 
 Risk- versus rules-based 
The third Cyber issue studied was how to achieve mission-level autonomy, which 
is not usually available in COTS systems without customization. It is usually 
implemented on a Windows, Linux, or MacOS system (on-board companion computer or 
ground-based system), and is often open-source or COTS dependent. Examples of 
software infrastructures used in this context include Robot Operating System (ROS), 
Mission Oriented Operating Suite (MOOS), MATLAB Robotics Toolkit, and Microsoft 




Figure 40 - Typical On-UAV Architecture 
The project’s analysis identified the following issues related to the security of 
mission-level autonomy: 
 Security of implementation platforms 
 Hardware and software are not UAS-specific 
 Custom and in-house development 
 Correctness versus security 
 Open source infrastructure 
 Low likelihood of malicious intent 
 Cyber vulnerabilities may be present 
 Trustworthiness of maintenance processes 
 COTS infrastructure 
 Vetting and validation 
In order to best implement mission-level autonomy, the project recommends that 
developments: 
 Utilize “best practices” on companion computer & ground-based autonomy host 
systems 
 Formally assess open-source and COTS robotics software 
 Encourage security-focused versions such as SROS 
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 Develop risk-based utilization requirements criteria 
 Provide risk-based security requirements guidance for autonomy software 
development 
The fourth Cyber issue studied was associated with the autopilot and flight 
control. These functions typically have the following characteristics: 
 COTS (i.e., the source of many current UAS Cyber concerns) 
 Vendor controlled and aligned with associated GCSs 
 Proprietary and protected 
 Possible ongoing communication with the vendor 
 Update processes and requirements 
 Open architecture 
 Open source firmware for COTS hardware 
 ArduPilot & PX4 most common 
 Can be used as-is or customized 




Figure 41 - Typical Flight Control Architecture 
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The project’s analysis identified the following issues related to the security of the 
autopilot and flight control: 
 COTS  
 Operational data relay to vendor possible  
 Vendor-initiated update possible 
 Hidden vulnerabilities? 
 Open architecture 
 Reliability concerns (will vehicles perform predictably?) 
 Open-source communities’ alignment with DoD objectives is not a given 
 Hobby vs racer vs autonomy requirements 
 Isolated design decisions 
 Unexpected codebase changes possible 
In order to leverage existing architectures and components for autopilot and flight 
control while still maintaining security, the project recommends that: 
 COTS  
 Require network isolation (if risk merits) 
 Require firmware transparency (e.g., source code) 
 Develop risk-based criteria for utilization 
 Open architecture 
 Develop formal assessment processes 
 Provide a risk-based requirements framework 
4. Conclusions & Recommendations 
In conclusion, UAS Cyber issues are not necessarily UAS-specific. They are often 
addressed more generally, and can be characterized according to the portion of the system 
that they affect. COTS, open-source, and in-house-developed systems have unique 
characteristics which must be accounted for prior to deployment. We recommend: 
 Enforcement of recognized “best practices” 
 A risk- versus rule-based approach 
 Formal requirement vs risk framework 
 Formalized open-source and COTS product evaluation 
 Requirements for evaluation of in-house-developed software and firmware  
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III. CHALLENGES OF NAVAL OPERATIONS TO 
CYBERSECURITY 
Maintaining Cybersecurity in a naval operational environment poses its own 
unique challenges. Christian Fitzpatrick gave a presentation on the Marine Corps’ efforts 
to implement signals intelligence and Cyber simulations in their training environments. 
Anthony Akil analyzed the 2017 Vulnerabilities and Equities Policy as it related to zero-
day exploits in military technology. This session was chaired by Anthony Akil. 
A. LVC SIMULATION SUPPORT FOR THE MARINE CORPS’ CEMOES 
Presenter: Christian Fitzpatrick, Naval Postgraduate School, Modeling Virtual 
Environments and Simulation (MOVES) Institute 
1. Introduction 
As the global network continues to expand, our adversaries are taking advantage 
of the worldwide connectivity to achieve both strategic and tactical effects. In 2007, 
Russia first engaged in cyber warfare when they clashed with Estonia over the relocation 
of a Soviet World War II Memorial from the capital of Tallinn. During this political 
dispute, Estonian networks were targeted in a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack 
[31]. As a result, Foreign and Justice Ministry websites were shut down along with online 
banking sites. Although the Russian government never claimed responsibility, electronic 
fingerprints indicated the attacks originated from a mix of their government and non-
government computers [31]. 
China also has an active presence on global networks as reported in 2013. The 
former Mandiant uncovered a secretive People’s Liberation Army (PLA) cyber unit 
working from an office in the outskirts of Shanghai [32]. Based on months of network 
analysis, its analysis team collected technical evidence of multiple Cyber-attacks on 
American corporations, organizations and government agencies [32]. With unlimited 
funding to employ talented scientists, China’s military is developing a robust Cyber 
program targeting a broad cross-section of American interests. 
Aside from our near-peer competitors, terrorist organizations are achieving a 
certain level of success operating on global networks using wireless devices. The Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) uses the internet to spread its message and actively recruit 
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educated fighters to join its cause. One well-known insurgent is Mohammed Emwazi, 
nicknamed “Jihadi John” by the European media. Emwazi was responsible for several 
brutal ISIS beheadings; but prior to his war crimes, he achieved a computer science 
degree in 2009 from the University of Westminster [33]. 
Finally, in 2016, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), and the National Security Agency (NSA) claimed with “high 
confidence” that Russia had intervened in the U.S. Presidential elections [34]. Their goal 
was to degrade our democratic process and assist in damaging Candidate Clinton’s 
election bid [34]. To achieve its goals, Russia supposedly embarked on a sophisticated 
campaign to influence the American people. Although unproven, many feel that Russian 
President Putin used cyberspace to achieve these goals. The investigation is still on-
going.  
In this new domain, programmers are the combatants. Like other domains (air, 
land, and sea) with robust training programs, the training sand box for cyberspace 
operations is not well developed. Modeling and simulation (M&S) is emerging as a 
critical capability to develop and sustain our Cyber forces and toolsets. The MOVES 
Institute at NPS is moving out in two areas to support the DoD’s goals in cyberspace 
training and analysis. First, it is modeling cyberspace behaviors and their effects on the 
battlefield within existing combat simulations. This activity serves to develop emerging 
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and to perform testing, training, and 
evaluation (TT&E) on new cyber systems and tools. Second, MOVES is contributing to 
the creation of cyberspace emulation environments for tactical survey and assessment. 
The work described below describes MOVES’ support of the Marine Corps Systems 
Command as they work to transition of the Constructive Electromagnetic Spectrum 
Operations Emulation System (CEMOES) to the Fleet to support tactical cyberspace 
training events at each of the Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs). 
2. Summary 
Live training for signals intelligence (SIGINT) and Cyber operators lacks multi-
domain realism, as their simulation-based training is not networked or distributed. 
Current training environments emulate signals from a single location on a physical range, 
making it easy for operators to locate the transmitter and collect data. This does not 
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emulate the challenging tactical environment our Marines and Sailors face when 
deployed overseas. They will face an enemy that has various digital signatures and is 
constantly on the move. To mitigate this training gap, the Marine Corps developed a 
concept for a distributed simulation system based on the capabilities of software defined 
radios (SDRs) called the Constructive Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Emulation 
System, or CEMOES. By transmitting various signals including commercial cellular, 
WiFi, and VHF from a select SDR emplaced among other SDRs distributed on a local 
physical range, CEMOES can help Marines and Sailors learn how to survey “noisy” 
signal environments to support their tactical mission. 
Considering the dramatic size, weight, and power (SWaP), and cost reduction of 
SDRs that is taking place, current $100,000 and 30 lb. systems are being replaced with 
$2,000 and 1 lb. systems. Only specially trained warfighters are carrying these radios. 
However, these niche systems may soon become standard issue to all operators. The 
CEMOES seeks to prepare the DoD for the eventual coming of standard issue SDRs by 
creating a training methodology using the computational and transmitting power of SDRs 
to create noisy, distributed SIGINT/Cyber emulation environments that mirrors the 
challenging tactical Electronic Warfare (EW) environment they operate in while 
deployed (see Figure 4241). 
 
 
Figure 42 - Initial CEMOES Concept developed in 2014 
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Following initial testing and demonstration while this technology was a research 
program at the Office of Naval Research (ONR) Code 30, it was selected as a program of 
record (PoR) following the submission of a Deliberate Universal Needs Statement 
(DUNS) endorsed by the Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) 
in the winter of 2015. Now as a PoR, CEMOES is planned for delivery to each of the 
three MEFs in FY19, 20, and 21. 
3. Background 
In the 1960s, companies used a single, large-scale computer for their data 
processing needs. Configured as a circuit-switched network, “dumb” terminals and line 
printers were connected to a central host via a single connection using proprietary 
communications protocols [35]. This infrastructure was brittle and could not scale to 
meet increased demand. Consequently, businesses never considered buying hardware 
from another vendor to augment their existing system. Instead, they just replaced their 
hardware entirely. Cross-platform connectivity was unheard of at that time [36].  
Seeking a more reasonable approach, the Department of Defense (DoD) began 
experimenting with a data packet switched network in 1968 [36]. The new project was 
called the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANet) and it would later 
go on to become the Internet. Today, it serves as a fault-tolerant, vendor-independent 
network that can tie any and all people together. With its worldwide adoption for 
business and personal use, cyberspace is now a relevant domain for tactical operations. 
Meanwhile in Silicon Valley, microprocessor chips were advancing rapidly as 
well. In 1971 Intel co-founder, Gordon Moore, made a bold prediction that future 
processors would double in efficiency every 2 years [37]. His vision has become a reality 
and is evident as users shift their primary platform from personal computers (PCs) to 
wireless, mobile devices. Currently, over 3 billion people carry smartphones in their 
pockets [37]. Each is more powerful than room-sized supercomputers of old.  
Given the functionality of these smartphones, users no longer need multiple 
devices. This has triggered a synthesis of individuals’ personal lives blurring with their 
professional lives and other affairs. Today, the spectrum is as noisy and congested as it 
has ever been. Various state and non-state actors are taking advantage of this. For 
example, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is using wireless devices to access the 
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internet, actively recruit and educate fighters, manage their expenses, and promote their 
ideology. Considering their recent successes, our military units must be able to operate in 
this global network and adapt quickly to technical advancements to support signals 
intelligence (SIGINT) tasks during tactical missions.  
4. Proposed Solution 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has signaled that they need focused 
cyberspace training capability at the tactical edge as most current training systems are at 
the enterprise level. Tactical operators working in the Radio Frequency (RF)-to-Cyber 
environment lack a facility to train and certify their cyber operators. In addition, they 
don’t have a specific range to enable them to hone their cyber TTPs. The National Cyber 
Range (NCR) and the DoD Information Assurance (IA) Range were established to meet 
this need, but again training at those facilities is at the enterprise level. An organic, unit-
deployable capability like CEMOES enables our Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines to 
conduct realistic cyberspace training at the tactical edge. In addition, using CEMOES to 
stimulate handheld SDRs across an operating unit could facilitate information operations 
(IO) and military deception (MILDEC) by transmitting into the RF physical environment 
creating more “noise.” 
Upon delivery to the Fleet, CEMOES will be a rapidly deployable support 
structure to allow for the development, testing, use, and employment of Computer 
Network Exploitation (CNE) and Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO) tools. It will 
also connect all local Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) ranges to the Joint 
Training and Education Network (JTEN) for continuous (weekly) full-spectrum training 
with integration with other services, Cyber Mission Teams, Red Teams, and Strategic 
Agencies. Constructive simulations should be integrated to drive tactical scenarios in 
relevant environments. Sustainment training should be created as well (Cyber 30/60/90, 
Cyber T&R). For the system to succeed though, CEMOES must include a sharable 
library of full-spectrum scenarios that models interesting communications embedded in 




Figure 43 - Modeling a Noisy Environment 
CEMOES has been under test since 2014. Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Lincoln Laboratory (MIT-LL) has been coordinating tests with operators to validate the 
technology. The first test in the Fall of 2014 took place on an urban range located at 
Camp LeJeune, North Carolina (see Figure 4443). The range was a perfect fit for 
demonstrating the capabilities of CEMOES as it had an existing wired infrastructure to 
support an internet protocol (IP) based network. That network was emplaced to run a 
moving target system for live-fire training. Using the network, MIT-LL was able to run 
its packet generation system named Lincoln’s Adaptive Real-Time Information 
Assurance Testbed (LARIAT). LARIAT can emulate over 100,000 virtual IP addresses 
and the passing of data packets across the virtual network to model various activities on 
the internet to include the use of software applications, sending emails and posting on 
blogs (see Figure 4544). Many of these activities are also conducted on small handheld 




Figure 44 - Physical Training Environment at Camp LeJeune, NC 
To guide the development of the virtual and constructive simulation, we will 
first author a complex script in which multiple actors and units interact to achieve 
specific goals in and through cyberspace. At a minimum, the script will include all 
dialogue between actors, any digital content created, media & webpages accessed, and all 
entity digital signatures. This data will provide a structured representation of the entities 




Figure 45 - Current LARIAT Capabilities 
Once all actors and their roles are defined, we will instantiate them as entities in 
the simulation. Each will have unique variables and parameters to define their view of the 
world state making them a unique persona. As the simulation advances, their variables 
will follow a piecewise constant trajectory to define their location, movement status, or 
available hardware. Their parameters, on the other hand, will remain static throughout 
and include classification (adversary, friendly, or neutral), scenario role, or technical 
proficiency. Select entities will be geo-referenced within the exact physical dimensions of 
a DoD urban training range while others will operate remotely on the global network. 
The remote entities will still affect the overall state space through various forms of web 
interaction. 
Since there is no “human-in-the-loop,” all entity behaviors must be defined prior 
to the start of the simulation run. For this purpose, we will use Discrete Event Simulation 
(DES) event graphs. The world state will differ each time the DES event graph runs, thus 
creating dynamic outcomes upon execution. Our event graphs will begin with a high-
level description of the activity they model. Through action decomposition, the tasks 
required to reach a goal state will be broken down into sub-tasks. Multiple orderings of 
those sub-tasks can lead to the goal task and conditional statements determine the exact 
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sequence of execution. Completion of the goal task indicates the entity has achieved a 
desired world state.  
Figure 4645 illustrates an example event graph in the context of a tactical RF-to-
cyber scenario where an entity is tasked to conduct an information operations (IO) 
activity to achieve a tactical effect. The event graph nodes show a methodical process to 
obtain network access, create content for the IO mission, post the content, await 
responses until a desired threshold is reached, and the assess the effect. The nodes 
correspond to an event, or state transition, and each edge corresponds to the scheduling of 
the next event [38]. Event graphs will be constructed for every behavior detailed within 
the script and those behaviors will be triggered by various event listeners assigned to each 
entity. We will be utilizing the DES libraries contained in Java SimKit containing code 
that will schedule events to occur based on world state and scheduling relationships. 
 
Figure 46 - Example Event Graph to guide an agent executing a information operations (IO) behavior 
The live simulation will require utilization of the Field Programmable Gate Array 
(FPGA), Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) RF Transceiver, and RF Filter 
Banks embedded within a SDR (Figure 4746). For scenario RF communications, the 
baseband data specific to the transmission will be stored on the SDR. 
The FPGA will digitally up-convert and then modulate the signal based on the 
device selected to transmit the message in the event graph. The RF Transceiver will then 
convert the digital signal to an analog signal for transmission over-the-air, allowing for a 
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wide range of wireless signals to be emulated, without the burden of costly “one off” 
hardware. In Figure 4645, the “Post Content” and “Respond” nodes will follow this 
process to emulate RF transmissions specific to the scenario. 
The receive and digital processing capabilities of an SDR will also be used as 
some agents may be assigned a communication received “listener” to trigger a specific 
behavior. If this is the case, the signal must be received, converted to a digital signal by 
the ASIC, and then digitally down converted by the FPGA. Digital Signal Processing 
(DSP) algorithms will then be used to determine the content of the message. The 
REDHAWK SDR framework will enable that data to be shared between the various 
software radios on the network triggering the event graph aligned to the message heard 
by the virtual agent’s “listener” [39]. Learning this middleware framework will enable 
our warfighters to use SDRs for various IO and MILDEC operations as required by the 
mission. By creating their own RF environment for training, they will become more 
proficient in using the SDRs to better impact the RF-to-Cyber environment. 
 
Figure 47 - Internal components of a tactical SDR used for live, constructive simulation 
5. CEMOES 
CEMOES is a methodology to create this signal environment by deploying a live, 
virtual, constructive (LVC) training simulation over a distributed RF network emplaced 
in a representative tactical setting (see Figure 4847). Since it is financially and 
logistically unfeasible to have thousands, or even hundreds, of role-players on-hand to 
recreate the RF-to-cyber environment for small-unit training events; our work seeks to 
replace them with intelligent, virtual agents. By leveraging the embedded general 
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purpose processors (GPP) of tactical software defined radios (SDR), we can dynamically 
run their automated planning processes in a structured DES. Then, we’ll connect the 
virtual world with reality by using the internal RF components of the same SDR to 
transmit detectable waveforms into the physical environment based on a simulated 
agent’s progression through a planning process to achieve a goal state. As we anticipate 
all warfighters carrying hand-held SDRs in the future, our goal is to improve 
tactical unit proficiency with these systems and make training easily accessible by 
creating simulation software executable from their organic equipment. 
The MOVES Institute is partnering with MIT-LL in FY 2019 to develop a 
scenario generation tool to enhance Lincoln Adaptable Real-time Information Assurance 
Testbed (LARIAT) for tactical cyber training. The system resulting from this 








Figure 49 - MIT-LL engineer deploying the CEMOES System on a live range 
6. Role of MOVES 
Through the final development of this work, it was critical to have well-developed 
scenarios for use on the system. For testing this system from 2014 through 2016, subject 
matter experts (SMEs) in the Marine Corps developed the content required for 
environment emulation. This process was tedious and demanding. Since it is unrealistic 
for our operators to develop scenarios prior to each training event, the MOVES Institute 
is investigating the application of existing constructive simulation to the scenario 
development effort. In FY19 and early FY20 while one CEMOES is planned for delivery 
to II MEF, NPS is investigating the application of One Semi-Autonomous Forces 
(OneSAF) and CyberSAF to the system. CyberSAF is contained in OneSAF version 8.8 
and is a government off-the-shelf (GOTS) system developed by Cole Engineering 
Services, Inc. (CESI). If the CyberSAF is compatible with CEMOES, the Marine Corps 
seeks to use the simulation as the primary scenario development tool.  
The next step in this solution is integrating constructive simulations to make the 
system more dynamic and ease the creation of scenarios. CyberSAF was selected for 
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analysis to determine potential integration into LARIAT and the overall infrastructure of 
CEMOES. At a recent AFCEA Conference, Dr. Daniel Lacks, the Chief Scientist at CESI 
described CyberSAF as “a OneSAF system configuration, an open source framework 
designed to provide automation for planning, training, situational understanding, exercise 
support, testing, experimentation, acquisition, and analysis capabilities in an array of 
mission-specific kinetic, non-kinetic, and cyber land, sea, air and space environments” 
[41]. It “addresses interactions between cyber effects, and cyber and kinetic domains, by 
responding to signals which, for example, may take control and crash a simulated 
unmanned vehicle; passively watch video feeds generated by the simulation; and activate 
or deactivate simulated Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) devices” 
[41]. “OneSAF also provides low fidelity emulation of realistic mission-specific logical 
environments such as cell towers, IP networks, and satellite links” [41]. 
We expect to deliver results and integration recommendations in October 2019. 
7. Integration of LVC 
The Live Virtual Constructive (LVC) concept is defined as follows [42]: 
 Live: A live simulation involves real people operating real systems. Military 
training events using real equipment are live simulations. They are considered 
simulations because they are not conducted against a live enemy. 
 Virtual: A virtual simulation involves real people operating simulated systems. 
Virtual simulations inject a human-in-the-loop in a central role by exercising 
motor control skills, decision skills, or communication skills. 
 Constructive: A constructive simulation includes simulated people operating 
simulated systems. Real people stimulate (make inputs) to such simulations but 
are not involved in determining the outcomes. A constructive simulation is a 
computer program. 
The MOVES LVC Laboratory is on a closed network due to use of export-
controlled software. This lab seeks to become a testbed to address digital interoperability 
issues of current tactical C2 systems by creating complex LVC scenarios that interoperate 




Figure 50 - MOVES LVC Lab 
The LVC Lab is intended to support live virtual simulations such as the control of 
Software Defined Radios (SDRs) as illustrated in Figure 5049. 
8. Future Work 
This project plans the following work for FY 2020: 
 Scenario Development methodology using CyberSAF integrated with LARIAT 
 Networking Constructive Simulations to C2 devices for LVC training 
Future goals of this project include: 
 LVC Lab in all Tactical Units to support SIGINT/Cyber LVC training 
 Distance Learning courses to help with network set-up and use 
B. ZERO-DAYS, ONE OBLIGATION 
Presenter: Anthony Akil, NPS, USN 
1. Summary 
Zero-day exploits create a tradeoff for nation-states, forcing them to decide what 
they value more: increasing current and potential operational capability or increasing 
critical infrastructure and end-user security. Nation states have an obligation to protect 
their citizens, but they have to decide which of these conflicting objectives best fulfills 
that obligation. How would utilitarianism inform this decision and U.S. policy? This 
thesis sought to evaluate the 2017 Vulnerabilities and Equities Policy (VEP) on moral 
grounds. It used John Stuart Mill’s conception of rule and sanction utilitarianism to 
define a nation’s moral obligation. It assessed that the VEP, while largely fulfilling the 
utilitarian obligation, did not completely meet the terms. The VEP as constructed is an 
agreement between agencies, and permanence and transparency should be increased by 
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turning it into an E.O. or legislation. The ES role should be shifted from NSA to DHS, 
and allowance for NDAs should be removed. For further details, see [43]. 
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IV. CYBERSECURITY ARCHITECTURES & HARDWARE 
While studies of the fine details of Cybersecurity are important, it is also 
necessary to examine the architecture and hardware of these systems. Ron Durbin gave a 
presentation assessing the Cybersecurity risk in weapon system supply chains. Brian 
Smith’s presentation explained the work of NASA’s Airspace Operations and Safety 
Program (AOSP) Cybersecurity Group. This session was chaired by Douglas Fouts of the 
Naval Postgraduate School, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering. 
A. CONTINUOUS MONITORING, FRAGILITY, AND TRUST 
Presenter: Ron Durbin, Air Force Institute of Technology School of Systems and 
Logistics (AFIT/LS) 
1. Summary 
Authorizing Officials (AO) make risk-based decisions to grant an Authorization 
to Operate (ATO). For weapon systems, the two primary sources of cybersecurity risk are 
penetrations and supply chain. We are unaware of an effective process for assessing 
cybersecurity supply chain risk for operational weapon systems. This project found that 
mining existing data may provide clues to cybersecurity supply chain risk in operational 
aircraft. This project recommends a process for identifying the components most likely to 
have been affected, and also identifies challenges to effective continuous monitoring for 
new supply chain threats. This project recommends that data sources and data reduction 
approaches be identified so that those aircraft components most likely to have been 
subject of a supply chain compromise are examined. For selected components detailed 
analyses should be performed to rule out compromise. Solutions to challenges in 
continuous monitoring of supply chain integrity should also be identified. 
2. Objectives and Background 
This project has three objectives; 
 To assure mission success by securing weapon systems against Cyber attacks and 
incorporating resilience to ensure mission accomplishment in cyber-contested 
environment. 
 To provide Authorizing Officials with credible Cyber risk assessments. 
 To accurately assess weapon system supply chain cybersecurity risk. 
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Laws, regulations, and policies require all information systems be authorized for 
use (FISMA [44], DoDI 8500.01 [45], and AFI 17-101 [46]). The basis of authorization 
is that operational utility outweighs security risk. This judgement is absolutely dependent 
upon accurate assessment of security risk. 
The system context for the study is shown in Figure 5150. 
 
Figure 51 - Context Diagram 
Sources of risks are intrusions, hygiene failures, malware, and the supply chain. 
Intrusions are unauthorized Cyber access to a weapons system or any access that has 
Cyber effects. Hygiene failures are non-malicious behaviors that place systems at risk. 
Malware is installation of unauthorized software in a system. Supply chain risks include 
the incorporation of devices, materials, or components that 
 Cause the system to not do that which it must do 
 Cause the system to do that which it should not do 
 Cause premature failure of subsystems or components 
The attack environment is shown in Figure 5251. The risk source model is shown 




Figure 52 - Attack Environment 
 
Figure 53 - Risk Source Model 
According to the Director of National Intelligence [47], supply chain Cyber risk 
derives from products that: 
 Are defective 
 Are counterfeit 
 Contain malware 
 Contain exploitable weaknesses  
 Are from sources with unknown trust 
Modifications can be inserted at multiple points in the supply chain. These would 
ideally (from the attacker’s perspective) permit an adversary to cause a weapon to 
degrade or fail in a manner and at a time of the adversary’s choosing. It should also be 
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difficult to detect, i.e., benign until invoked, affect most or all weapons of a particular 
type, and have a long mean time and high cost to repair. In the best (or worst) case 
scenario, the weapon will be made operationally ineffective, which will force us to use 
more costly and less effective means and subject irreplaceable assets such as aircraft and 
aircrews to unacceptable risks. 
Potential supply chain insertion points for malicious modifications are shown in 
Figure 5453. 
 
Figure 54 - Supply Chain Insertion Points 
3. Proposed Approach 
This project proposes to base the estimate of the probability of a supply chain 
attack (PSCA) on an assessment of maintenance anomalies over the previous three years. 
Additionally,  PSCA will be continuously assessed by examining changes made to system 
components after t0. A timeline of our proposed approach is shown in Figure 5554. 
 
Figure 55 - Proposed Approach Timeline 
 
71 
The project used the following metrics to quantify probability of attacks. We 
measured the rate of introduction of new components to operational systems in terms of 
Line Replaceable Units (LRU), Shop Replaceable Units (SRU), and software/firmware. 
Since the attack path is the introduction of new components, a low rate of replacement 
suggests lower opportunity for attack. In almost every case there are too many 
components to permit a comprehensive assessment. We will use our approach to provide 
objective assessment of susceptibility to supply chain attack and conduct focused, in-
depth assessments on the most vulnerable components. 
4. Assessing Existing Supply Chain Risk 
This project postulates that supply chain malfeasance would cause anomalies 
during typical aircraft operations. We identified four cases, 
1) No anomalies detected, no supply chain attack has occurred 
2) No anomalies detected, supply chain attack has occurred 
3) Anomalies detected, no supply chain attack has occurred 
4) Anomalies detected, supply chain attack has occurred 
Initially cases 1 and 3 were excluded and we focused on cases 2 and 4. 
Additionally, we postulated that instances of mission degradation are documented and 
that mission degradation attributable to cyber-physical systems is documented in 
maintenance data systems. These include the Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance System 
(CAMS) and the Reliability and Maintainability Information System (REMIS). While 
some attributions will be incorrect due to missing data, false positives and negatives, and 
Cannot Duplicate (CND) malfunctions, it is, “Far better an approximate answer to the 
right question, which is often vague, than the exact answer to the wrong question, which 
can always be made precise.”, to quote John W. Tukey. 




Figure 56 - Anomaly Filter 
The top-level assessment considers unscheduled maintenance, scheduled 
updates/upgrades, and incidents. These elements may be assessed in any order, serially or 
concurrently. The objective is to make an immediate assessment to identify components 
for in-depth analysis. The aforementioned elements are diagrammed in Figure 5756. 
 
Figure 57 - Weapon System Supply Chain Risk Assessment 
When the maintenance process was examined in greater detail, it was found that 
the source of the components affects risk exposure. COTS components are inherently less 
trusted than known developers (trusted h/w, s/w). We immediately assessed the risk of 
the maintenance process as Low or Moderate, and we recommend an in-depth 




Figure 58 - Maintenance Process Assessment 
Upgrades involving new development follow a process similar to maintenance, 
while other upgrades require an assessment of changes. A diagram of the upgrade process 




Figure 59 – Upgrade Process Assessment 
The incident process is relatively conservative and more likely to result in an 
elevated assessment of risk and an in-depth assessment of the target component. A 




Figure 60 - Incident Process Assessment 
Case 2, also known as “the Black Swan”, is unique in that a supply chain attack 
has occurred but there are no anomalies detected. In this case the existence of a “binary 
weapon” must be assumed, and there must be a supply chain flaw capable of causing 
mission degradation or failure in a command and control mechanism. This is a classic 
example of an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT). No anomalous behavior until 
deliberately triggered, either automatically by geolocation or some other criterion, or 
manually via an external entry point in the weapon system (e.g., a legitimate but unused 
bit-oriented message). 
5. Conclusions 
We believe that supply chain attacks on cyber-physical systems produce 
discernible anomalies. Evidence of these anomalies, if it exists, is present in one or more 
existing data stores. The existence of supply chain tampering in the absence of anomalies 
may require reassessment of some or all of our approach. We recommend that data 
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sources and data reduction approaches be identified so that those aircraft components 
most likely to have been subject of a supply chain compromise are examined. For 
selected components detailed analyses should be performed to rule out compromise. 
Solutions to challenges in continuous monitoring of supply chain integrity should also be 
identified. 
B. CYBERSECURITY ENGINEERING PLAN FOR NASA AIRSPACE 
OPERATIONS AND SAFETY PROGRAM (ASOP) 
Presenter: Brian Smith, NASA Ames Research Center, NASA Airspace Operations and 
Safety Program (AOSP) 
1. Summary 
The Airspace Operations and Safety Program (AOSP) Cybersecurity Engineering 
Plan (CEP) describes the technical approach to the organization and management of the 
AOSP Cybersecurity Engineering implementation. This project found that the AOSP 
Cybersecurity Group plans to tailor and implement NASA System Engineering (SE) 
processes and industry best practices in Security Engineering in support of the program’s 
mission to develop, produce, and transition secure and securable, trustworthy technology 
products to their partners. This project recommends that the AOSP Cybersecurity 
Engineering Plan provide guidance for how all technical and administrative cybersecurity 





Figure 61 - Systems Engineering 
The discipline of systems engineering is complex, and practitioners must balance 
protection needs, security relevance, security risk management, and trustworthiness and 
assurance. These elements are shown in Figure 6160. The AOSP Cybersecurity 
Engineering Plan will enable AOSP to support the development of secure and securable 
research technology products within cost, schedule and other applicable constraints in 
order to enhance, streamline and assure their ready acceptance and integration within the 
customer’s security environment and operational context upon transition to end users 
outside of NASA. 
The AOSP Cybersecurity Group will tailor and implement NASA System 
Engineering (SE) processes and industry best practices in Security Engineering in support 
of the program’s mission to develop, produce and transition secure and securable, 
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trustworthy technology products to their partners. This plan defines the technical 
management of the AOSP Cybersecurity Engineering processes and will evolve and be 
revised to contain any changes and all phases of the program’s life cycle. 
This plan also describes how all technical and administrative cybersecurity 
engineering activities will be integrated throughout the program. It supports the 
management of program activities by providing the top level technical implementation 
plan. Additionally, it will act as the primary source document for any lower level 
technical plan and will provide the basic implementation and processes which all lower 
level plans will inherit. 
3. Approach and Data 
AOSP’s plan to use NASA SE processes and industry best practices defines the 
technical management of the AOSP Cybersecurity Engineering processes and will evolve 
and be revised to contain any changes and all phases of the research program’s life cycle. 
The AOSP Program is and will be responsible for communicating to the AOSP 
Cybersecurity Engineering Group technologies and products requiring cybersecurity 
engineering design and development activities. The AOSP Cybersecurity Engineering 
Group will in turn engage with AOSP/ARMD Program and Project Management to assist 
with cybersecurity concern mitigation and/or integration arising from the program goals 
to successfully transition its technology products to the customer environment. 
Project Formulation Engagement will assist with formulation activities to ensure 
cybersecurity principles are infused from the beginning and assure that a clear risk – 
benefit balance is maintained to manage resources by including cybersecurity risks and 
concerns. Technology Formulation and Development will provide guidance during 
technology and development, especially in avoiding surface technology issues that may 
impact long term viability or adoption of the technology product into the customer target 
environment. Project KDP/Tollgate reviews will provide guidance and assistance at Key 
Decision Points (KDPs) during the program, project and technology development life 
cycle. 
The Remaining Secure Life (RSL) concept could prove useful for emerging 
aviation IT systems coming out of the R&D world. This concept is similar to Remaining 
Useful Life (RUL) used by fault prognosis systems to predict the remaining useful life of 
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operational components or systems. Just as prognostics systems seek to detect impending 
non-malicious failures and assessing remaining useful life based on the damage 
sustained, so will Security Prognostics assess cyber-health of a system and its Remaining 
Secure Life – a measure of the urgency with which security issues must be addressed. 
The study of comprehensive failure modes in the progression of Cyber damage leads to 
the assessment of Remaining Secure Life (RSL). Some compromises will be fairly 
benign – while others may require immediate action. Depending on mission context or 
state of a critical asset, action to shut down the asset may be required and feasible, but in 
other cases a more measured response may be required. 
The applicable documents and authorities are identified in Figure 6261. 
 
Figure 62 - Applicable Documents and Authority 
The implementation of the security engineering technical processes proposed by 




Figure 63 - Security Engineering Technical Processes Implementation 
Additional systems engineering functions and activities are shown in Figure 6463. 
 
Figure 64 - Additional SE Functions and Activities 
The AOSP Cybersecurity Engineering Group (CEG) uses an architectural 
methodology to determine and analyze the Protection Needs required by the future 
customer’s operational context. The group develops three perspectives of the customer’s 
operational environment. These perspectives are developed from artifacts and 
information about the operational context provided by the customer and are herein 
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referred to as enabling products. The perspectives and their respective enabling products 
are the stakeholder’s perspective, the system perspective, and the trades perspective, and 
are shown in Figure 6564. 
 
Figure 65 - Architectural Principles 
The Protection Needs development activity is diagrammed in Figure 6665. A high 








Figure 67 - High Level Architectural View for Protection Needs Development 
Many of the systems covered by the SEP involve network-centric operations. A 
diagram of the network-centric operations domain is shown in Figure 6867. 
 
Figure 68 - Network Centric Operations Domain 
There are a few caveats. While the SEP does utilize ISO/IEC 15288 [48], a 
systems engineering standard covering processes and lifecycle stages that are 




Figure 69 - ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 Processes & Structure 
IEC 61508 is an international standard published by the International 
Electrotechnical Commission consisting of methods on how to apply, design, deploy, and 
maintain automatic protection systems called safety-related systems. Its components are 
shown in Figure 7069. 
 
Figure 70 - IEC 61508 Components 
There are multiple organizations that have security responsibility for the National 
Aerospace Standard (NAS). They are as follows: 
 Aviation Information Sharing and Analysis Center (A-ISAC) - The Aviation 
sector-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) is a non-profit, 
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member-driven organization formed by critical infrastructure owners and 
operators to share information between government and industry.  
 Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) - 
Within the NCCIC (National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 
Center), the ICS CERT program provides research and advisories through the 
efforts of joint partnerships within industry, industry experts, and the Advanced 
Analytic Lab (AAL). 
 National Cyber Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) - 
A 24/7 Cyber situational awareness, incident response, and management center 
that is a national nexus of Cyber and communications integration for the federal 
government, intelligence community, and law enforcement.  
 Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration Program (CISCP) - A program for 
public-private information sharing whereby the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and participating companies share information about Cyber threats, 
incidents, and vulnerabilities.  
 Enhanced Cybersecurity Services (ECS) - A voluntary information sharing 
program that helps U.S.-based public and private entities protect their systems 
from unauthorized access, exploitation, or data exfiltration. 
The cybersecurity engineering group technical effort boundary is shown in Figure 
7170. 
 
Figure 71 - Cybersecurity Engineering Group Technical Effort Boundary 




 Directly funding or executing security mitigation work within an R&D project 
development effort. 
 Operational security control implementation (deployment, configuration, 
assessment) in NASA environments and systems. This includes physical, 
intelligence and IT systems security considerations. 
 Operational security control implementation (deployment, configuration, 
assessment) in customer environments and systems. This includes physical, 
intelligence and IT systems security considerations. 
 Lack of communication among high level NASA management as to the 
expectations, requirements, and implications of the overall security process. 
The CEG utilizes modern systems engineering principles that focus on developing 
“trustworthiness” as a quality attribute of the system as a whole rather than making it 
“safe”, “secure”, or “verified and validated” in any deterministic fashion. The security 
engineering framework that it uses is shown in Figure 7271. 
 




The Protection Needs Development Activity is executed with the following foci: 
 Purpose 
 Define Stakeholder System Security Requirements providing needed capabilities 
in the Stakeholder’s operational environment. 
 Inputs (from) 
 Stakeholder Perspective Analysis 
 System Perspective Analysis 
 Trades Perspective Analysis 
 Expected Outcomes 
 Stakeholder security interests and concerns are identified. 
 Required security characteristics, context and capabilities for all applicable life 
cycle stages of the technology under development are identified. 
 Stakeholder assets and their categorization are identified. 
 Assets posture vs. threat environment is identified. 
 Asset protection priority and assurances needed are identified. 
 Stakeholder Protection Needs are identified and prioritized. 
 Security derived system constraints are identified. 
 Stakeholder Security Requirements are derived from Stakeholder Protection 
Needs. 
 Security related system performance measures are identified. 
 Stakeholder agreement and concurrence that their Protection Needs and 
expectations are met via the Security Requirements developed is achieved. 
 Enabling systems/services needed to support security aspects for stakeholder 
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V. PANEL ON MONTEREY CYBER INSTITUTE 
Jeff Paduan (Chair), Naval Postgraduate School, Dean of Research, Jim Newman, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Space Systems Academic Group, Dan Boger, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Department of Information Sciences, and John Drummond, SPAWAR, Naval 
Information Warfare Center Pacific 
1. Introduction 
The objective of the Monterey Cyber Institute is to respond to the following 
challenges: 
 How can NPS maximize its impact within DoD around the critical topic of 
Cybersecurity? 
 How can the essential role for industry partnerships be supported as suggested by 
SECNAV Spencer? 
NPS is responding to these challenges by elevating the collaborations goal within 
its 2018-2023 strategic plan, Action H1.1, in order to streamline the processes for 
working with industry and other academic institutions. 
To quote the Secretary of the Navy,  
“We all have an interest in ensuring NPS endures as the postgraduate 
research and educational institution of choice for the Navy-Marine Corps 
team and our partners. But going even further, I want this institution to be 
the primary educational and research-based enterprise that partners with 
the private sector and academia to provide solutions to the vexing 
problems facing national security across the whole of government.” 
The Honorable Richard V. Spencer, 2 February 2018. 
Government groups are not coordinated. The National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), for example, lacks standards in some areas and penalties for 
breaking standards in others. Another example is the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), which lacks critical infrastructure needed to manage Cyber risk. 
Industry is waking up to the threats. As hackers and state actors become ever 
more sophisticated and capable, the government is likely to react (or over-react) soon. 
2. Why Monterey? 
 NPS is a unique graduate school with a defense focus and students with real-
world experience in defensive cyber. 
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 NPS has cutting-edge Cybersecurity research, including unique and world-class 
experience from faculty and students in Computer Science, Electrical 
Engineering, Defense Analysis, and Operations Research. 
 Insider Threat Expertise exists at the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), 
Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) and Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
 NPS is in a desirable location capable of attracting leading industry experts; it has 
close proximity to Silicon Valley and its many technology companies. 
 There are opportunities for policy work through partnerships with the Panetta 
Institute, Stanford’s Hoover Institute, and Georgia Tech’s Sam Nunn Institute. 
 NPS has substantial and available SCIF space. 
 NPS has proximity to California State University, Monterey Bay (CSUMB), the 
Defense Language Institute (DLI), and the Middlebury Institute of International 
Studies (MIIS). 
 NPS has direct support from SECNAV Spencer 
3. How Can the Monterey Cyber Institute (MCI) be successful? 
NPS has unique capabilities but is subject to all government rules. MCI, therefore, 
needs a bridging organization to be successful. Possible bridging organizations include: 
 University Accelerated Research Center (UARC) 
 Federally Funded Research and Development Corp (FFRDC) 
 Air Force WERX (AFWERX) 
 In-Q-Tel (IQT) 
 Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) 
 Other Transactions Authority (OTA) 
UARC Model is the best (and possibly only) mechanism. The Georgia Tech 
Research Institute (GTRI), for example, has a broad range of Cyber expertise, including: 
 Quantum computing and sensing 
 Trusted microelectronics 
 Vulnerability assessment of embedded systems (Relevant to DoD COTS UAV 
ban)  
 Mission-assured C2 
 Analytics for Cyber defense, threat, and attribution (Overlaps with NPS CORE 
Lab interests and capabilities 
 Multi-level secure software systems 
 Advanced cyberspace operations 
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Georgia Tech has Cyber policy interests in the “Sam Nunn Center”, and can 
coordinate with the Panetta and Hoover Institutes. Figure 73 shows how the UARC 
model could apply to the Monterey Cyber Institute. 
 
Figure 73 – UARC Model for MCI Bridging Organization 
4. Questions for Consideration 
 How do you see Cybersecurity playing in your field? 
 Is there a need for DoD/Industry collaboration? 
 What are some sample projects? 
o SCADA controls for industrial machinery? 
o Municipality/first responder threats from Cyber attack? 
o Cyber defense policy? 
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VI. CYBER FUNDAMENTALS & MACHINE LEARNING 
This section of the workshop focused on the fundamentals of Cyber and 
applications of machine learning. David Dampier outlined the current state of 
Cybersecurity education and proposed a standard curriculum for masters-level and 
doctorate degrees. Stephen Hayne gave a presentation on NetBrane, a machine learning 
analytics engine developed to defend against DDOS attacks. John Monaco’s presentation 
addressed the security risks presented by machine learning when applied to 
communication between distributed system components. Brian Smith reprised his 
presentation on the risks of integrating AI the National Airspace System from the first 
section of the workshop. Finally, Nikolaj Bjørner presented the work of Microsoft 
Research on their Z3 SMT solver and described some of its applications to Cyber 
problems. This session was chaired by John Monaco of the Naval Postgraduate School 
and David Dampier of the University of Texas at San Antonio. 
A. FUNDAMENTALS OF CYBERSECURITY 
Presenter: David Dampier, University of Texas, San Antonio 
1. Summary 
Cybersecurity education is going through a transition at this time toward 
accreditation and standardization. There is very little similarity between what is taught at 
most institutions teaching Cybersecurity in the U.S., but there is a need to provide some 
standardization. 
This project found that most schools that claim to be Centers of Excellence in 
Cybersecurity Education are merely centers of interest. The number of graduates in 
Cybersecurity, although increasing annually, is not enough to meet the demands of 
government and industry employers. This is exacerbated by the fact that many graduates 
require extensive training. 
This project recommends that standardized curricula be developed for 
Cybersecurity education. That standardization should be done with an eye toward NIST 
standards [50], CAE Knowledge Unit standards [51], and industry needs. It should be 
noted that the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) is also 
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releasing Cybersecurity criteria to join other computing disciplines such as computer 
science, information systems and information technology. 
2. Background 
Cybersecurity is first and foremost a problem, not a discipline. Any instruction 
must be presented as an approach to solve the Cybersecurity problem, no matter what 
specific discipline is involved (e.g., computing, engineering, project management, etc.). 
Instruction must also be hands-on either through live exercises or through virtualized 
experiences equivalent in rigor, and graduates must be able to go to work Day One. 




There are also other factors to consider, such as risk assessment and non-
repudiation. These components are applied in three paradigms: 
1) Prevention of potential threats. 
2) Detection and analysis of ongoing threats. 
3) Post-mortem analysis of past threats. 
A diagram of the National Institute for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) 




Figure 74 - NICE Cybersecurity Framework 
There are ten primary principles of Cybersecurity. 
1) Domain Separation: Separating areas where resources are located to prevent 
accidents and loss of data. Another way to put it is keeping information worlds 
from colliding. 
2) Process Isolation: A process occurs when a task is executed. Keeping processes 
separated prevents the failure of one process from negatively impacting another. 
3) Resource Encapsulation: Resources in this context are hardware, system objects, 
or processes. These must be separated and used as intended. 
4) Least Privilege: This limits what access people have to your resources and what 
they can do with them. 
5) Layering: Having multiple layers of defense protect information. If one layer is 
defeated, the next layer should catch it. This is also known as redundancy. 
6) Abstraction: A fancy word for summarizing or explaining in a way that can be 
easily understood. Leaving the details hidden to avoid information overload. 




8) Modularity: Each module has its own function, is able to be inserted or removed 
from a project, and is interchangeable with other modules. 
9) Simplicity: If something is less complicated, it’s less likely to have problems and 
easier to troubleshoot and fix. 
10) Minimization: To simplify and decrease the number of ways software can be 
exploited. 
3. Proposed Criteria 
The structure of the proposed ABET Engineering Accreditation Criteria 
Cybersecurity engineering curriculum must provide both breadth and depth across the 
range of engineering topics implied by the title of the program. This includes probability, 
statistics, and cryptographic topics including applications appropriate to the program. It 
must also include discrete math and specialized math appropriate to the program, such as 
abstract algebra, information theory, number theory, complexity theory, and finite fields, 
as well as engineering topics necessary to analyze and design complex devices, software, 
and systems containing hardware, software and human components. 
Coverage of computer science topics is also necessary. The first of these topics is 
the application of security principles and practices to the design, implementation, and 
operations of the physical, software, and human components of the system as appropriate 
to the program. The second topic is the application of protective technologies and 
forensic techniques. The third topic is the analysis and evaluation of components and 
systems with respect to security and to maintaining operations in the presence of risks 
and threats. The final topic is the consideration of legal, regulatory, privacy, ethics, and 
human behavior topics as appropriate to the program. 
In regard to faculty, the program must demonstrate that faculty members teaching 
core engineering topics understand methods of engineering design, engineering problem 
solving, and engineering practice with specific relevance to security. These program 
criteria provide a foundation for lifelong learning in a dynamic field. They provide a 
uniform set of sound principles to help students, employers and programs. 
The proposed ABET Computing Accreditation Commission (CAC) Cybersecurity 
curriculum differs slightly from the EAC curriculum. In addition to the general 
curriculum requirements, the following specific student outcomes are required: 
 An ability to apply security principles and practices to the environment, hardware, 
software, and human aspects of a system. 
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 An ability to analyze and evaluate systems with respect to maintaining operations 
in the presence of risks and threats. 
The CAC curriculum requirements specify topics, but do not prescribe specific 
courses. These requirements include at least 45 semester credit hours (or equivalent) of 
computing and Cybersecurity course work. The course work must cover the application 
of the crosscutting concepts of confidentiality, integrity, availability, risk, and adversarial 
thinking. Additionally, fundamental topics from each of the following subjects should be 
covered: 
 Data Security 
 Software Security 
 System Security 
 Human Security 
 Organizational Security 
 Societal Security 
 Advanced Cybersecurity topics that build on crosscutting concepts and 
fundamental topics to provide depth. 
 At least six semester credit hours (or equivalent) of mathematics that must include 
discrete mathematics and statistics. 
The knowledge of the following subjects is critical to Cybersecurity education. 
 Fundamental understanding of programming as a problem solving tool 
 Knowledge of data organization, including numbering systems (binary vs. 
decimal vs. hexadecimal) and data structures, sizes, and types. 
 Knowledge of persistent memory types. These include physical and logical 
storage, the architecture, geometry, interfaces, and sector addresses of hard drives, 
and the types of removable media such as Firewire, USB, and multimedia cards. 
 Knowledge of volatile memory types. These include RAM, process memory, 
virtual memory like pagefile or swap, threads, modules and libraries, Windows 
volatile data, and Linux/Unix volatile data. 
 Knowledge of file systems, including information stored by file systems in 
general and key differences between major file systems. 
 Knowledge of network fundamentals. These include the OSI/Internet model, basic 
protocols, and IP addresses, ports, and services. Familiarity with forensic data that 
can be obtained from networking devices (IDS/IPS, firewalls, routers, switches, 
DNS servers) and basic levels of network data analysis is also necessary. 
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 Knowledge of virtualization, including VM configuration, setup, and guest 
analysis, the uses of virtualization, types of clouds and hypervisors, and supply 
chain issues with virtualized hardware. 
Current academic programs in Cybersecurity take three forms. The first is a 
Bachelor of Business Administration (BBA) in Cybersecurity. These can be augmented 
with a minor in digital forensics or a certificate in pathogenic outbreak investigations. 
The second is an MS in Information Technology with a concentration in Cybersecurity. 
The third is a Ph.D. in Information Technology, with a concentration in Cybersecurity. A 
Venn diagram of the common areas of study between digital forensics and biological 
defense is shown in Figure 7573. 
 
Figure 75 - Cross Disciplinary Subjects of Digital and Biological Forensics 




Figure 76 - Sampling of Cybersecurity Courses 
The structure of the first variant, a BBA with a major in Cybersecurity is shown in 
Figure 7775. 
 
Figure 77 - Major: BBA in Cybersecurity 






Figure 78 - MS in IT, Cybersecurity Concentration 
A world-class online Cybersecurity education should have three traits. The first is 
a remote lab capability, with experiential learning, scalability, and 24/7 remote access. 
The second is a modular curriculum that will share common modules, retain unique 
modules, and combine modules into a course. The third is cross-disciplinary coursework, 
including an interdisciplinary core and capstone, and a mixture of majors in modules. A 
diagram illustrating these traits is shown in Figure 7977. Extracurricular activities are 









Figure 80 - Extracurricular Activities 
B. NETBRANE: DETECTING AND PROTECTING FROM DDOS ATTACKS 
Presenter: Stephen C. Hayne, Colorado State University 
1. Summary 
In order to defend against a distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack, defensive 
software should be aware of current traffic, topology, and potential next attack. 
Geographically distributed cloud capabilities and Software Defined Network (SDN) 
should be quickly deployed to minimize disruption and collateral damage. Once under 
attack, use DNS/anycast infrastructure to redirect traffic. SDN should be employed to 
filter attack traffic and tunnel legitimate traffic. 
NetBrane is a dynamic machine learning on-premises “cloud” analytics engine. It 
uses the following elements to detect and counter DDOS attacks: Internet structural 
information, Line-Rate capture, Traffic modeling and outlier classification, and Hacker 
Chatter. 
This project found that firewall rules based on outliers can reduce attack traffic 
significantly to pre-attack levels with few false positives. If Colorado State University 
had NetBrane, the 2014 NTP DDoS would have been blocked within minutes with little 
impact to services. This project proposes to deploy to an ISP test site with mirrored traffic 
to minimize network risk within $100k capital expenditure per sensor. 
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2. Problem Description and Approach 
Distributed denial of service attacks can cripple government and business alike. 
Examples include, but are not limited to GitHub, Mirai, Krebs, SpamHaus, and Akamai. 
While the monetary cost is significant, the impacts of DDOS attacks are increasingly 
non-financial and serve as a cover for other subversive operations. If small businesses 
hosted by ISPs are attacked (e.g., by 300,000+ IOT devices), they can be forced into 
bankruptcy. Amazon risks $3.5B in transactions/sales during CyberMonday, and cannot 
be offline for more than four hours during this critical time. The solution to DDOS 
attacks needs to be distributed and proactive, with continuous high-speed reconnaissance, 
reliable detection and prediction models, networked structural information to avoid 
collateral damage, quick and robust filter deployment, and the ability to use tips from 
insiders to stay ahead of the game. 
The approach used by NetBrane sees the tsunami coming and blocks the wave(s) 
as they hit, allowing it to reduce attack traffic by >80% within a few minutes. NetBrane is 
a dynamic machine learning on-premises “cloud” analytics engine. It uses the following 
elements: 
 Internet structural information (BGPMon) – prefix hijack alerts 
 Line-Rate capture (DPDK) and flow creation (Flowride) – 40G 
 Traffic modeling and outlier classification (FPCA) - processes 10G streaming 
data and detects outliers 
 Hacker Chatter (RIPEX) - 7 dark forums monitored/analyzed 
A high-level diagram of NetBrane is shown in Figure 8179 
 
























A diagram of NetBrane’s architecture is shown in Figure 8280. 
 
Figure 82 - NetBrane Architecture 
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Flow Creation engine:  
 Flowride → {Protobuf → {JSON,CSV} or sflow / Netflow} 
 We deploy an SDN network 
 Two options for flow capture:  
o on a separate node, ii) directly on the SDN node with OVS and virtual tap 
devices 
This process is realized using the structure shown in Figure 8381. 
 
Figure 83 – Flow Creation Engine Structure 
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The Flowride metrics are shown in Figure 8482. 
 
Figure 84 - Flowride Performance Metrics 
For line speeds of 40Gpbs at 3.5Mpps and ~35000 active flows, 12 cores are 
needed. In order to export data to consumers, MessageQueue (RabbitMQ) and interfaces 
to sFLOW/NetFlow collectors are used. The latter is what most network admins know 
and already use. 
The analytics workflow in NetBrane is shown in Figure 8583. The process is 
mostly automated, augmented by human assistance for interpretation and validation in the 
“Assess Risk” step. 
 
Figure 85 - Analytics Workflow 
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The analysis must cope with missing sensor values which are illustrated in Figure 
8684. Network sensors send the data they collect in a stream, and the table shows the 
effects of interruption at various points in the stream of data (i.e., middle, end, or 
randomly throughout). The irregular behavior of the sensors could be just due to sensor 
issues, or it could be due to malicious attack patterns. 
 
Figure 86 - Missing Values (Sensors) 
DDOS attacks are not typically a single event. A replay of the NTP attack from 
2014 is shown in Figure 8785. The graph shows how the number of network packets 





Figure 87 - NTP Attack (2014) 




Figure 88 - NTP Attack Map 
This pattern of DDOS activity enables machine learning to drive reactive 
defensive measures. Currently the NetBrane system needs to be initialized during a 
period of “normal” activity (i.e., pre-attack). This project analyzed a sliding window of 
history of around 30-45 minutes, but did keep a historical volume (by minute) of all prior 
available data (configurable) in an SQL database for thresholding. The threshold is set 
pre-attack, during initialization. Graphs of the packet count and bytes over time data are 
shown in Figure 8987. 
 
Figure 89 - Packets/Bytes over Time 





{𝑋𝑡} + 𝑐𝑣 ∙ 𝑆𝐸 (max
𝑡∈𝐻
{𝑋𝑡}) 
Where 𝑋𝑡 is series (minutes) of aggregated packets or bytes, 𝐻 is the window of 
history kept, 𝑐𝑣 is a specified critical value, and 𝑆𝐸 (max
𝑡∈𝐻
{𝑋𝑡}) is the standard error from 
a locally estimated scatter plot smoothing (LOESS) model. This represents the largest 
acceptable packet or byte count and accounts for variability among the history. 
Fuzzy Principal Component Analysis (FPCA) is applied in two passes, both of 
which remove outliers. The Eigenfunction distribution(s) are more “normal” and thus 




Figure 90 - FPCA Two Passes 
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DDOS attacks typically have network flow patterns that show up as statistical 
outliers. This is illustrated with data from the NTP attack in Figure 9189. 
 
Figure 91 - NTP (October 20, 2014) Scanners 
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The project used circle plots to help human analysts see and recognize patterns in 
network traffic. A diagram explaining a circle plot is shown in Figure 9290. 
 
Figure 92 - Circle Diagram 
Cluster analytics reveal different types of network traffic patterns that are shown 
in Figure 9391. Note that outlier patterns are not necessarily all threat. 
 










Amber - No Response
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Example circle diagrams from both the pre-attack and attack period are shown in 
Figure 9492 and Figure 9593, respectively. The distributions are visibly different. 
 
Figure 94 - Pre-Attack Period 
Firewall rules based on outliers can reduce attack traffic significantly to pre-attack 
levels with few false positives, as illustrated in Figure 9694. If CSU had NetBrane, this 
DDoS would have been blocked within minutes with little impact to services, and the 




Figure 95 - Attack Period 
 
Figure 96 - NTP Attack Packets over Time 
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There are multiple benefits to NetBrane. First, it provides automated, distributed 
DDoS detection and mitigation in minutes. Its proactive defense minimizes collateral 
damage by deploying defenses informed by network structure, using massively parallel, 
elastic private cloud-based processing and ready-to-go defense measures informed by 
network reputation and hacker activity intelligence. Additionally, NetBrane has a small 
deployment footprint (6U). 
The competition to NetBrane is assessed in Figure 9795. 
 
Figure 97 – Assessment of Competing Approaches 
3. Status and Future Work 
Currently, a prototype of the 40G flow-creation tool and an advanced prototype of 
the 40G traffic line-capture tool have been created. The existing analytics infrastructure 
can process up to 10G of streaming lab data, and the Hacker Chatter tool has 7 dark 
forums monitored/analyzed. 
The next step is to deploy to a real test site. This site will mirror traffic, thereby 
incurring zero network risk. There will be a $50k capital expenditure per sensor on-
premises, including server, storage, and tap. $500k in funding from DHS and $150k in-
kind from ISP are also required. 
C. TIMING SIDE CHANNELS DUE TO HUMAN-COMPUTER 
INTERACTION 




There is a growing opportunity for unintended interference and communication 
between distributed system components. Emerging machine learning and statistical 
modeling techniques are capable of detecting and exploiting this kind of information 
leakage. The detection, measurement, and mitigation of such attacks remains a challenge. 
This project found that the urgency of a message is the need to transmit that 
message to maintain near-real-time responses in a distributed system. However, the time 
the message transmits can provide information about the internal state of a component 
which should remain hidden. There is a tradeoff between these two competing criteria. 
This project recommends that the tradeoff between message urgency and 
information leakage be systematically controlled by either leveraging existing sources of 
noise or obfuscating the signal by introducing noise. 
2. Background 
Distributed systems have a propensity to leak information through the timing of 
messages between system components, despite those messages being encrypted. A way 
malicious third parties can exploit this information leakage to perform device 
fingerprinting, traffic analysis, and other forms of reconnaissance is shown in Figure 
9896. 
 
Figure 98 - Timestamps Exposed 
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The timing patterns of messages have been historically referred to as “the senders’ 
fist”, in the initial context of telegraph messages. A diagram of how the sender’s fist was 
used prior to modern computing is shown in Figure 9997. During World War I, the 
timing patterns were analyzed as a means of authenticating whether a message originated 
from a known trusted sender or not. 
 
Figure 99 - Looking Back 
A diagram of how the sender’s fist can be used in the 21st century to impact 
Cybersecurity is shown in Figure 10098. 
 








The host’s OS platform and version can be identified from DOM event 
timestamps. The threats introduced by this capability are de-anonymization, device 
tracking, and passive analysis. The following diagrams show how the timing of various 
processes can be used to identify the host system. Figure 10199 shows how these patterns 
can be distinguished in the time domain and in the frequency domain. 
 
Figure 101 - Clock Tick Reveals OS Family 
Figure 102100 explains the reason for these differences in the timing patterns. 
The actual time refers to the actual time of a key press, or more generally to the 
occurrence of any data triggering event. The software becomes aware of these events 





Figure 102 - System Timer Effects 
Several computational approaches can be used to automatically categorize these 
distinctions. Figure 103101 illustrates the use of an entropy measure for remotely 
fingerprinting a system’s clock rate based on the timings between transmitted messages. 
 
Figure 103 - Determining Timer Resolution 
Time delay embedding can also be used to identify hosts based on differences 




Figure 104 - Time Delay Embedding 
 
Figure 105 - Host Differences Revealed in Phase Space 
3. Mitigation Strategies 
There are three mitigation strategies to deal with information leakage: 
concealment, impediment, and obfuscation. Obfuscation using a timing buffer is shown 




Figure 106 - Time Interval Obfuscation 
There is, of course, a tradeoff between information gain and the time lag (i.e., 
usability and security). This is illustrated in Figure 107105. 
 
Figure 107 - Security/Usability Tradeoff 
A Keystroke-Level Online Anonymization Kernel, or “kloak”, can be used to 
obfuscate typing behavior on the host. The function of a kloak is shown in Figure 
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108106. A related question is whether use of a kloak can make it easier to identify the 
individual kloak user. 
 
Figure 108 - Keystroke-Level Anonymization Kernel 
In general, the homogeneity of a system can be an indicator for side channel 
attack severity, with more homogenous systems having a higher risk than less 
homogeneous systems. This is shown in Figure 109107. 
 
Figure 109 - Homogeneity as an Indicator 
In conclusion, timestamps are pervasive. Each device and user has a “fist” that 
can be used to identify and subvert a system. This project recommends that the tradeoff 
between usability and security be systematically controlled by either leveraging existing 
sources of noise or obfuscating the signal by introducing noise from new sources. 
D. AI AND SAFETY/SECURITY THREATS 
Presenter: Brian Smith, NASA Ames Research Center, NASA Airspace Operations and 




In the short-term, the project sought to identify practical safety/security risks in 
deploying machine learning systems: data poisoning, training set inference, lack of model 
interpretability, and undesirable model bias. In the mid-term, it assessed potential 
safety/security risks of future AI systems that are more powerful and more broadly 
deployed than those used today. Relevant problems in this space include scalably 
specifying and supervising reward-based learning, preventing unwanted side effects, 
generalizing out of domain, and ensuring that systems remain under control. In the long-
term, how might we ensure that an engineered (super)intelligence is aligned with our 
values, and what procedures can be used to conserve this alignment while supporting 
recursive self-improvement in security? For details, see Smith’s previous presentation in 
II.B. 
E. SECURING & BREAKING CYBER USING SMT 
Presenter: Nikolaj Bjørner, Microsoft 
1. Summary 
This project sought to enable trusted code development using automated theorem 
proving. It also sought to uncover security vulnerabilities with scalable and intelligent 
search. Z3 is a state-of-art Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solver from Microsoft 
Research which is used in a wealth of applications, including securing TLS/crypto 
libraries for Project Everest, fuzzing binaries for Project Springfield (originally called 
SAGE), and securing ACLs for Azure. This project recommends that verification tools be 
developed leveraging SMT technologies and integrated engineering processes. It also 
recommends that newer trends in Cyber, such as Software Defined Networking (SDN) 
and blockchain, be advanced. Finally, it recommends leveraging modern Cloud 
computing infrastructures for advancing the scale of SMT, propositional satisfiability 
(SAT) and automated theorem proving (ATP) technologies. SMT solving technologies 
are advanced and developed at a number of institutions. Besides Z3, the Yices solver is 
developed at SRI international and CVC4 is co-developed at Stanford University and 




Models – a set of values for variables that make a formula true – are important for 
cyber applications. Classical theorem provers do not produce models, but SAT and SMT 
solvers like Z3 do. Z3 solved to date hundreds of billions of constraints created by 
SymEx tools, including SAGE checking Win7-10 and Office, and is used by Pex, Static 
Driver Verifier, and many other tools. It has uncovered several thousand security 
vulnerabilities. A diagram of Z3’s symbolic analysis process is shown in Figure 110108. 
 
Figure 110 - Symbolic Analysis with Z3 
A list of symbolic analysis engines is shown in Figure 111109. On the right, a set 
of advances in symbolic solving in Z3 are listed. They correspond roughly to publications 




Figure 111 - Symbolic Analysis Engines 
3. Verifying the Cloud & Cloud Powered Verification 
We first put cloud scale verification in context of current Microsoft Azure 
networking. Microsoft operates one of the largest networks in the world, with 50+ Azure 
regions, 8,000+ ISP sessions, 180+ edge sites, 44 ExpressRoute locations, and 33,000 
miles of lit fiber. A map of Microsoft’s network is shown in Figure 112110. There is a 
broad diversity of paths, with 2 per DC (metro), 3 per Region (terrestrial), and 3+ per 
Continent (subsea). This network is optically innovative with low-cost 100G QSPF 
optimized for metro networks. SDN control allows for intelligent traffic management and 





Figure 112 - Microsoft's Global Network 
There are two perspectives on theorem proving and the cloud. The first, using 
theorem proving to improve networks, is illustrated in Figure 113111, and the second, 
using networks to improve theorem proving, is illustrated in Figure 114112. 
 
Figure 113 - Network Verification 
 
Figure 114 - Network Powered Verification 
The first perspective is illustrated by the methods to maintain the relationship 
between reality, intent, validation, and feedback that is shown in Figure 115113. Another 
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example is analyzing Access Control List (ACL) policies for a data center, as shown in 
Figure 116114. Intent in Azure datacenters are mainly captured at an architecture level, 
thus it is possible to extract contracts for the correct behavior of a data-center network 
from databases that store the data-center designs. The contracts can be checked locally 
against the ACLs and routing tables on each router. 
 
Figure 115 - Intent = Reality? 
 
Figure 116 - Scaling ACL & Reachability Checks with Local Contracts 
The second perspective is illustrated by use of parallel computation to enable 
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VII. INSIDER THREATS 
Insider threats are a problem common to all kinds of security systems. William 
Roof explained how a user’s personal information can be gathered from their social 
media and used by attackers to gain access to otherwise secure systems. Ryan Kelly gave 
a presentation on how to effectively counter insider threats with man-machine teaming. 
Sharon Runde explained other issues surrounding insider threats and recommended the 
use of runtime monitoring to mitigate these risks and vulnerabilities. This session was 
chaired by Shelley Gallup. 
A. THE INSIDER THREAT PROBLEM 
Presenter: Shelley Gallup, Naval Postgraduate School, Department of Information 
Sciences 
1. Summary 
The old adage “finding a needle in a haystack” does not quite fit the Insider 
Threat problem. Instead, it is more like “finding a needle in a needle stack.” The threat is 
often hidden and careful, the insider knowing all that is needed to be part of the “crowd.” 
It is a cumulative problem—layering of sufficient resources and data about an individual 
to find that part that is different, potentially consequential. This part has to be enough of a 
trigger that it gets the human and machine system to notice. Knowing in advance that 
there is a possible insider threat to the organization is in the category of “we don’t know 
what we don’t know.” And what is it that creates knowledge of a potential threat? If 
known, what happens next? Since March 2013 students and faculty of the Graduate 
School of Operations and Information Sciences (GSOIS) have wrestled with these 
questions and problems from multiple perspectives [53] [54] [55]. These include the use 
of crowd sourcing to prioritize the major issues, with the result that policy, data 
availability, data sharing, and technology head the list. Technically, the ability to match 
profiles to potential threats is feasible, but “tuning” the system to lower false positives is 
a must, and difficult for a number of reasons. From the themes provided in the crowd 
sourcing game, numerous projects have been the subject of thesis work outlined below. 
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2. Summary of Previous Work 
An NPS thesis by Richard Mascolo investigated the question “Insider threat 
operations: Is collaboration a key factor?” Insider threats (InTh) are often unknown, 
inconspicuous, and hard to detect. To effectively manage this problem, big data must be 
shared, processed, and developed into threat indicators across multiple organizations and 
then managed by InTh hub operations. Barriers to data sharing and processing limit threat 
discovery, processing, and management required for highly effective collaboration. By 
determining enablers and barriers to data sharing and processing within InTh 
organizations and their contributory effects to InTh efficiency, a prototype solution can 
be designed to improve collaboration. Enabling collaboration internally at the hub and 
with other organizations is likely to improve the efficiency and provide a lower false-
positive rate. 
Recommendations included a common SharePoint portal, a risk factor number to 
establish a common baseline of both individual and team risk, a common approved 
software package, regular working groups, cross training initiatives, crowdsourcing 
aggregation, and lateral processes. All of these solutions have the potential to help 
establish a single networked strong/weak tie collaborative opportunity. The greatest 
difficulty here is not technical but bureaucratic, where seams of organizational data 
sharing produce legal and other restrictions. What is needed at this time is multiple 
datasets from organizations that would be expected to share data, for the purpose of 
technical and procedure testing. 
Another NPS thesis by William Campbell on “System of Systems Approach to 
Insider Threats” examined insider threat detection and analysis processes and proposed 
an approach to enhance the hub analytical cell. Insider threat hubs rely heavily on internal 
sources of data such as user activity monitoring. This ignores additional external data 
sources of insider threat indicators. An ExtendSim simulation was created to show the 
effects of the inclusion of multiple nodes and to simulate hub operations based on 
Defense Security Service (DSS) and National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) 
insider threat hubs. Each simulation tested the processing rates of the hub analytical cell 
in order to demonstrate the relationship between throughput and false positive rates. 
Alerts were processed based on highest priority (first-in-first-out basis), the source of the 
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alert, and the Unique Identifier associating the alert with a specific user. The major 
finding of this thesis is that a process of identifying insider threat indicators with only 
User Activity Monitoring (UAM) ignores external sources of data and technology and 
contributes to a gridlock of priority 1 and 2 alerts, while ignoring priorities 3 and 4. It is 
possible that knowing this, potential threats would seek to be in priority 3 or 4, thereby 
“spoofing” the system. 
A third NPS thesis by Jay Sellen addressed insider threat data sharing. Insider 
threat is a significant problem for both governmental and private organizations. 
Individuals can do immense harm with their trusted accesses. To combat this threat, 
organizations have created departments with trained analysts whose sole purpose is to 
deter, detect, and mitigate the insider threat. These analysts monitor employees and 
analyze activities to detect dangerous practices, whether witting or unwitting, and report 
these actions to supervisors for mitigation. When organizations share insider threat 
information with other organizations, it can improve their abilities to deter, detect, and 
mitigate the insider threat. The challenge lies in merging external and existing data with 
as little human interaction as possible. This thesis examined the work that takes place in 
an insider threat department and identified requirements for a solution that would allow 
for information sharing between organizations, as illustrated in Figure 118116. 
 




Recommendations from this project emerged in the following: 
1) Work through policy issues enabling shared data across an enterprise. As noted 
above, there are many similarities to the theses that were completed, with data 
sharing as the number one need. There are many challenges here. Legal, HIPPA 
(federal and state health information laws), financial disclosures, and financial 
health are just a few. Also, the most recent efforts seem aimed at only participants 
with security clearances. Both unclassified and classified domains may reveal 
behaviors that have correlation with willful or unintended actions. The lack of 
cross-domain sharing of data is just another layer that creates difficulty in 
aggregating information for analysis. 
2) Bring machine learning into the stream of data, and across domains. Learning 
systems must be employed as the amount of data is simply too much for available 
analysts to process manually. This would likely be a human-machine team at the 
outset, followed by increasing reliance on increasingly subtle correlations. 
3) Organize in ways that enhance the analyst’s ability to move an indication 
forward. Organizationally it is not clear what the path is for analysts to move 
indicators forward to higher and higher levels of concern. In this research effort 
several organization schemes were offered, however none were tested by the hub. 
This was at least partly because the concept of a “hub” continues to evolve and is 
not yet clear. 
B. PERSONAL INTELLIGENCE (PERSINT) 
Presenter: William Roof, William H. Roof & Associates, Inc. 
1. Summary 
Personal intelligence, or PERSINT, offers a wealth of personal information to 
Cyber attackers for use in “getting inside” networks and computer systems. Users can 
reduce the instances of PERSINT-driven insider Cyber threats by removing all personal 
references from the system access process. Administrators must understand what users 
post on the Internet and develop training to counter the “you are your own insider” threat. 
2. Background 
The goal of this presentation was to begin a dialog concerning the intelligence 
collection threat posed by Cyber criminals with unfiltered access to personal information. 
Although personal information is available in many forms, across many venues, this 




NATO defines HUMINT as "a category of intelligence derived from information 
collected and provided by human sources.” Critical intelligence information provided by 
humans may be either with or without their knowledge, and with or without their 
understanding of the potential consequences. 
Personal Intelligence (PERSINT) is generated by people who willingly share 
personal information, with little or no understanding or concern for the potential 
consequences. It includes analysis of personal information, knowingly or unknowingly 
shared by people about themselves, their families, their friends and their co-workers. 
PERSINT-exploitable Internet portals may include social media, chat rooms, genealogy 
sites, dating sites, political blogs and other venues where people provide personal 
information, at all levels, to an unknown and potentially hostile audience. As society 
moves forward in using facial and voice recognition, we can expect computer 
applications and Internet sites that capture facial images and voice recordings to provide 
a fertile PERSINT hunting ground. 
3. Examples of PERSINT in Advanced Persistent Cyber Threats 
Advanced persistent threats (APTs) often show characteristics of military field 
operations, especially when compared to other types of Cyber threats. APTs require team 
planning and are organized into five phases. Phase One is reconnaissance, where 
attackers seek to understand and develop a target. Phase Two is incursion, where 
attackers gain entry into a system to deliver a Cyber payload. This step is where 
PERSINT is most damaging. Phase Three is discovery, where attackers patiently identify 
the target’s strengths and weaknesses from the inside. Phase Four is capture, where 
attackers manipulate discovered weaknesses to access targeted information. Phase Five is 
exfiltration. In this phase, attackers retrieve, analyze, and exploit captured information. 
During the incursion phase systems are highly susceptible to insider Cyber threats 
that may attempt to gain access by posing as trusted users. Attackers often target user 
passwords to mask the appearance of intrusion attempts. When chosen by users, 
passwords often reflect personal information such as friends, family, and pet names, as 
well as birthdates, personal events, etc. Much of this information, in bits and pieces, is 
available from users’ social media, blog, dating, and genealogy posts. Gathering 
information from social media, Cyber attackers assemble the PERSINT puzzle by 
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employing sophisticated algorithms or brute-force approaches to gain access to the 
network, its backbone, and the data it should protect. 
Five examples of readily available personal information examined in this 
presentation are Facebook, Instagram, Tumblr, Reddit, and Ancestry.com. 
1) Facebook is a social networking website where users can post comments, share 
photographs and post links to news or other interesting content on the web, chat 
live, and watch short-form video. A sample of the personal information available 
on Facebook is shown in Figure 119117. 
 
Figure 119 – Facebook 
2) Instagram is a photo and video-sharing social networking service owned by 
Facebook, Inc. Examples of personal information available on Instagram are 




Figure 120 – Instagram 
3) Tumblr is a microblogging and social networking website, parented by 
Verizon/AOL/Yahoo, which allows users to post multimedia and other content to 
a short-form blog. An analysis of a Tumblr profile is shown in Figure 121119. 
 





4) Reddit is massive collection of forums where people can share news and content, 
or comment on other members’ posts. It is a subsidiary of Advance 
Communications/Condé Nast. An example Reddit post is shown in Figure 
122120. 
 
Figure 122 – Reddit 
5) Ancestry.com LLC is the largest for-profit genealogy company in the world, 
operating a network of genealogical, historical record and genetic genealogy 
websites. A screenshot of an Ancestry.com family tree is shown in Figure 
123121. 
 




By gathering PERSINT from these platforms, an attacker can generate a list of 
potential passwords and answers to security questions in order to gain access to a system. 
A diagram of this process is shown in Figure 124122. 
 
Figure 124 - PERSINT Puzzle Pieces 
4. Recommendations 
In order to counter PERSINT collection through online platforms the presenter 
recommended that administrators establish multi-step, multi-biological, or hybrid system 
access logins to counter the availability of answers to “secret questions” on social media. 
These counter-measures include password/numeric code combinations, a combination of 
fingerprint and facial recognition, a fingerprint and iris scan combination, or some other 
two-factor authentication. He also suggested assigning randomly generated strong 
passwords to users (16 characters or greater) rather than allowing user to create their own 
passwords. Additionally, administrators should require users to memorize their 
passwords or store passwords in an encrypted password app on their mobile devices. No 
sticky notes, physical documents, or un-encrypted password files should be allowed. 
C. INSIDER THREAT ANALYSIS 
Presenter: Ryan Kelly, US Army 
1. Summary 
When attempting to analyze insider threats, overcoming the problem of 
information overload is key. Computers are not as good at solving this problem; although 
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they can analyze vast amounts of data they are less adept at taking context into account 
than humans. The project found that insider threat analysts organized in a team were 
marginally more accurate than those organized as individuals [56]. This project also 
tested a trustworthiness construct in order to reduce false positives in computational risk 
ratings. This project recommends that risk be perceived two-dimensionally in terms of 
trustworthiness and distrust factors, and that self-equity factors be leveraged to mitigate 
false positive in computational risk ratings. 
2. Introduction 
Information overload is a common problem when attempting to analyze insider 
threats. Programming a computer to do the job might seem like an obvious solution, but 
while computers can better handle large amounts of data they are currently incapable of 
continuously adapting to contextual changes like human analysts due to variations in 
contextual relevance. 
Additionally, there is the induction problem. Pedro Domingos framed the 
induction problem in his 2015 book “The Master Algorithm” with the question “How can 
we ever be justified in generalizing from what we’ve seen to what we haven’t?” [57, p. 
58]. David Hume also stated that, “it is impossible to discover causes and effects for any 
new observation, and any supposition thereon is completely arbitrary” [58, p. 17]. 
Therefore, humans must perform insider threat analysis, but there are known limitations 
to human information processing capacity [59]. 
Given than information overload occurs every time information processing 
demand is greater than capacity [60], the problem this project sought to solve is that 
insider threat analysts must overcome information overload to keep up with insider 
threats [61]. The project also sought to determine the best way to reduce information 
overload based on informational and temporal constraints. Several theories used to 





Figure 125 - Theories to Combat Information Overload 
3. Laboratory Experimentation 
The project conducted experiments to assess effects of teamwork and 
completeness of relevant information on the accuracy of insider threat assessments. 
Experiment stimulus scenarios from the National Insider Threat Task Force training 
course (2 exonerate, 2 implicate) were organized in an online environment. The 
“Adjudicative Guidelines for Access to Classified Information” (32 U.S.C. 147) informed 
the insider threat analysis. Participants all had top secret clearance, were trained in insider 
threat, were at a minimum bachelor’s degree educated, and were at GS-12 or equivalent 
pay grade. They were also incentivized with a one ounce “American Eagle” silver coin to 
make the work realistic as possible. An example scenario is shown in Figure 126124. 
A diagram of the experiment design is shown in Figure 127125. Ignorance is 
defined as the lack of relevant information that can affect how insider threat analysts 
make attributions for anomalous behavior. 
 




Figure 127 - Experiment Design 
4. Findings 
This project found that analysts organized in a team were marginally more 
accurate than those organized as individuals. Specialized teamwork significantly 
increases the time of ITA compared to participants’ individual work, and ignorance and 
teamwork interact with perception of information overload. Participants were little better 





Figure 128 – Findings 
While machine learning models are good at detecting insider threats, they also 
suffer from low base rates which leads to a problem of false positives. Learning machines 
predict future deviant behavior from past deviant behavior. Because insider threats 
generally have criminal history, it does not necessarily mean that those with criminal 
history are likely to become insider threats. To assume it does is example of a logical 
fallacy called affirming the consequent (if P then Q. Q then P). Additionally, it does not 
necessarily mean that those with no criminal history will not become insider threats. To 
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assume they will not is an example of a logical fallacy called denying the antecedent (if P 
then Q. not P then not Q). This, in essence, is a classic optimization problem: How does 
one best reduce false positives while minimally increasing false negatives? 
D. PROBLEMS FROM INSIDER THREATS 
Presenter: Sharon Runde, Naval Postgraduate School, Information Sciences Department 
1. Summary 
This project found that cracking down on threats because of ‘one bad apple’ 
causes adverse effects for the majority of loyal employees. Cyber hygiene and S/W & 
H/W vulnerabilities were identified as issues, as well as complex networks and the fact 
that system security is a moving target. This project recommends the use of runtime 
monitoring systems for mitigating identified threats and vulnerabilities, as well as further 
research into better prediction methods. 
2. Background 
When designing a system to deal with insider threats the designer must determine 
who the humans involved are and what their relationships are. Example: LT 
Schmuckerby. 
There are two types of errors, Type I and Type II. These are shown in Figure 
129127. 
 
Figure 129 - Types of Errors 
These categories were illustrated using examples on supply chain risks as follows. 
In the first case there are no anomalies detected and no supply chain attack has occurred. 
This is obviously the best case. In the second case there are no anomalies detected and a 
supply chain attack has occurred. This is a Type II false negative and can be either 
malicious or accidental. In the third case there are anomalies detected but no supply chain 
attack has occurred. This is a Type I false positive, and is accidental. In the fourth case 
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there are anomalies detected and a supply chain attack has occurred. Designers should 
focus on the second and fourth cases (IV.A.4). 
 Methods to prevent insider threats include: 
 Physical security 
 System logins 
 Access restrictions 
 Data flow control 
 Background checks 
 Reporting activity 
 Monitoring activity [53] [54] [55] 
Methods to deter insider threats are: 
 Security policies 
 Training 
 Consequences 
 Threat of detection 
In order to know that an insider threat has materialized, a designer must answer 
the following questions: 
 When do you know? 
o 5 ways of knowing: Agreement, The world as a formula, Multiple 
Realities, Conflict, Unbounded Systems Thinking [68] 
 How do you know you know? 
o Gaining empirical evidence 
o Analyzing risk exposure (including risk exposure, impacts, mitigation 
strategies) 
o Can AI help us profile users and identify anomalies? 
o How can AI help us detect and predict new threats, to include group 
activity? 
3. Solutions and Future Work 
Runtime monitoring can perform real-time analysis, but that may already be too 
late to prevent insider attacks. In order to increase the probability of detection, 
psychological theories such as General Deterrence Theory, Social Bond Theory, Theory 
of Planned Behavior, and Situational Crime Prevention should be leveraged. 
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Further research should explore: 
 Detecting Malicious Insiders in Military Networks 
 Monitoring Technologies for Mitigating Insider Threats 
 Insider Threat Prediction Tools: Evaluating the Probability of IT Misuse 
 Insider Threat Control: Using a SIEM Signature to Detect Potential Precursors to 
IT Sabotage 
It should also explore the epistemological question of how developers design an 
information system to know anything. Is the human in the loop or on the loop? 
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VIII. PANEL ON CYBER EDUCATION 
Paul Tortora (Chair), U.S. Naval Academy, Tracy Emmerson, U.S. Naval Academy, 
Duane Davis, Naval Postgraduate School, Cyber Academic Group, 
Sharon Runde, Naval Postgraduate School, Information Sciences Department 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The panel sought to define what Cyber education should be, not exclusively as a 
discipline but in terms of what every junior officer should know. The United States Naval 
Academy (USNA) graduates 1050 Midshipmen annually into the Navy and Marine 
Corps. They all must be prepared to lead in a complex cyber-enabled warfighting 
battlespace. The goal was to establish a baseline of Cybersecurity training and education 
for all 4,500 USNA midshipmen, in other words, an “all-many-few” approach to Cyber 
education. 
Currently, the majority of USNA incoming students have little to no 
understanding of Cybersecurity, the functioning of the internet, programming/coding, or 
the interdisciplinary nature of Cybersecurity. The panel recommended that: 
1) Cybersecurity fundamentals be taught to all students. 
2) Cybersecurity be infused to the largest extent possible across all academic fields. 
3) Opportunities for studies and experience in the Cyber domain be increased. 
These recommendations anticipated those laid out in the White House’s Executive 
Order on America’s Cybersecurity Workforce dated May 2, 2019, which is duplicated in 
full in Appendix A. The challenge from the Navy is to standardize Cyber education. 
Another question the panel sought to answer was how to define cybersecurity in 
an academic setting. Initially, USNA sought ways to align it with standards established 
by the Accreditation Boards for Engineering and Technology (ABET), however, none 
existed at the time (pre-2017). A collaborative study was done along with other ABET 
accredited schools to define criteria for cybersecurity academic accreditation. Wordle 
favored defining cybersecurity in the business area, while USNA created an entirely new 
department, the Cyber Science Department, to specifically manage USNA primary efforts 
in the classroom as related to Cyber education. The Cybersecurity BA degree at UT San 
Antonio is housed in the College of Business. 
ABET New Cybersecurity Fundamental Topics are as follows: 
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 Data Security: protection of data at rest and in transit. 
 Software Security: development & use of software that reliably preserves security 
properties of information and systems. 
 System Security: establishing & maintaining security properties of systems, 
including those of interconnected components. 
 Human Security: protecting individual’s personal data and privacy; threat 
mitigation combined with the study of human behavior as it relates to 
cybersecurity. 
 Organizational Security: protecting organization from cybersecurity threats & 
managing risk to support successful accomplishment of the organizations’ 
missions. 
 Societal Security: aspects of cybersecurity that can broadly impact society as a 
whole for better or for worse. 
DoD Objectives for Cyberspace are as follows: 
1) Ensuring the Joint Force can achieve its missions in a contested cyberspace 
domain; 
2) Enhancing Joint Force military advantages through the integration of Cyber 
capabilities into planning and operations; 
3) Deterring, pre-empting, or defeating malicious Cyber activity targeting US critical 
infrastructure that is likely to cause a significant Cyber incident; 
4) Securing DoD information and systems, including on non-DoD-owned networks, 
against Cyber espionage and malicious Cyber activity; 
5) Expanding DoD Cyber cooperation with allies, partners, and private sector 
entities. 
In order to cultivate talent, educational institutions and stakeholders should: 
 Embed software and hardware expertise as a core competency: 
o Establish a career track for computer science related specialties (including 
hardware engineers, software developers, and data analysts) that offers 
meaningful challenges, rotational billets at other Federal departments and 
agencies, specialized training opportunities tied to retention commitments, 
and the expansion of compensation incentives for the Cyber Excepted 
Service (CES). 
 Establish a Cyber top talent management program: 
o Provide most skilled Cyber personnel with focused resources and 
opportunities to develop key skills over the course of their careers. 
o Use competitive processes, including individual and team competitions, to 
identify the most capable DoD military and civilian Cyber specialists and 
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then empower those personnel to solve the Department’s toughest 
challenges. 
 Create a Cyber ready workforce: 
o Invest in building future talent, identifying and recruiting sought-after 
talent, and retaining current Cyber workforce. 
o Provide ample opportunities for professional development and career 
progression of Cyber personnel. 
o Ensure that Cyber requirements are filled by the optimal mix of military 
service members, civilian employees, and contracted support to serve 
mission requirements.  
 Enhance the Nation’s Cyber talent: 
o DoD play essential role in enhancing the Nation’s pool of Cyber talent in 
order to further the goal of increasing national resilience. 
o Increase efforts to promote science, technology, engineering, mathematics, 
and foreign language (STEM-L) disciplines at the primary and secondary 
education levels throughout the US. 
o Partner with industry and academia to establish standards in training, 
education, and awareness that will facilitate the growth of Cyber talent. 
USNA strategic challenges include: 
 Educating all of our students on the importance of cybersecurity and the Cyber 
domain as a warfighting area. 
 Developing cyber-related course(s) of study. 
 Creating a viable path for accessions of junior officers into the Information 
Warfare Community. 
It should be noted that “Wordle” is a free on-line tool that displays representations 
of words based on a word count in a “word cloud”. This is helpful in visualizing the 
relationship between concepts, and can allow for more accurate categorization, such as 




 How do you define cybersecurity? 
 How do you bound cybersecurity? 
 What do you include in a cybersecurity education curriculum? 
 What are some ideas for content? 
 Where does cybersecurity fit? 
 Who owns it, or should anyone own it? 
1. NPS Panelist 1 
Duane Davis: NPS is unique among institutions, our students come from a wide 
variety of undergrad programs and our purpose is to give them technical skills that they 
can take back to the fleet and apply critically in operational environments. 
We have specialized departments (Computer Science and Electrical and 
Computer Engineering) that provide deep technical Cyber programs. The Cyber 
Academic Group (CAG) focuses on operational Cyber billets that require technical 
expertise. Cyberspace operations is inherently multidisciplinary. Our program has 
Educational Skill Requirements (ESR) defined by the sponsors (OPNAV N2/N6 and 
FCC). The ESRs are a laundry list of broad, operationally focused technical and policy 
topics. All students in the cyberspace operations curriculum complete a set of core 
courses drawn from CS, ECE, and IS. Upon completion of the core, students choose a 
specialization track to focus on a specific aspect of cyberspace operations: engineering, 
computation, or systems and operations. 
Our curriculum is focused on operations (offensive, defensive, adversarial, etc.). 
A student needs not only a technical background but an operational perspective as well. 
We have Cyber policy and planning courses to get the students thinking not just from a 
technical standpoint but also considering questions such as what is the right thing to do 
within our authorities and how can we leverage friendly Cyber capabilities to prevent an 
adversary from achieving their objectives over ours?  
Challenges include students drawn from information warfare community that 
have non-traditional or non-technical undergraduate degrees. These students are often 
more suited for specific tracks in the cyberspace operations program. Students in the 
engineering track, for instance have to meet specific requirements to qualify for electrical 
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engineering degree (due to ABET requirements). Students not meeting those 
requirements may take the computation track (administered by CS), but may still have 
difficulty meeting certain requirements if they are not prepared technically or 
mathematically. Students in all three tracks must be brought up to speed very quickly. 
Thesis topic selection can also be difficult for students with less technical backgrounds 
who often don’t understand the domain or field well upon program entry. This is a 
situation that NPS has a great deal of experience with, however, and overall NPS does an 
excellent job at taking students that don’t have a background, getting them up to speed, 




2. USNA Panelist 
Tracy Emerson: Freshmen start with an introduction to cybersecurity. These 
students don’t know anything about computers or cyber. They may be adept at operating 
their phone but not more than that. The challenge facing instructors is how to educate 
beyond that. 
USNA developed a re-vamped introductory course. Previously, it was taught in a 
linear way. This caused problems with retention of information. Now it is more circularly 
taught, is interdisciplinary, and is taught with an eye towards the adversary. 
Students need to understand the basic concept of computers and cyber. They are 
also introduced to ideas such as policy, laws, ethics, human factors, social engineering, 
and how it plays into cyberspace. This helps define Cyber as a discipline.  
As the semester moves along, they build on baseline topics. Things like what is a 
program? Not necessarily the ability to be a programmer, but an understanding of a 
program and its vulnerabilities. They need to understand why it is important. 
Finally, in a virtual environment the students can do reconnaissance in a UNIX 
and API environment. They also do an attack lab to familiarize themselves with the 
perspective of a hacker. They then take lessons learned and use them defend the network, 
and harden the network by the end of 14 weeks. Again, the idea is basic familiarity so 
that students can understand why it is important. 
Students then do a case study and make a presentation and paper on something 
relevant in Cyber related to class topics. The overarching goal is to help students 
understand why Cyber is important. The transformation in the students is amazing. 
In their junior year they take a subsequent class from ECE. They focus on 
electromagnetic spectrum and how Cyber ties into it. This class builds on fundamental 
lessons from their freshman year.  
Some students select Cyber operations as their major. It is the fastest growing 
department (around 10% each year). In one year, the Cyber and CS departments took in 
110 and 70 new students, respectively. The Cyber department is attractive to students 
who are keen towards technical disciplines as well as drawn to humanitarian social 
sciences because it is interdisciplinary. These students understand that Cyber is important 
and they will tell you that’s why they choose the degree. They get a strong technical 
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underpinning in key traditional CS classes such as data structures, Python, C, SQL, JS, 
and others as required. Part of the core matrix includes Cyber physical systems to learn 
where the vulnerabilities are located and to include SCADA. They also take system 
architecture classes as well as courses on networking and wireless systems, which are 
taught from a Cyber perspective. The labs and instruction always look towards an 
adversarial perspective, as opposed to a CS student who does not necessarily focus in 
class on an adversary. The CS department and the Cyber department take a different 
approach to teaching the concepts.  
The students in the Cyber department also get some of the softer science topics 
such as policy, law, and ethics as well as human factors and social engineering. This 
distinguishes the approach taken by the USNA. Even technical students appreciate that 
understanding the battlespace requires a holistic assessment that includes the softer 
sciences. 
In their senior year they have a semester of offensive operations in a virtual 
network to learn to use and manipulate tools so they can learn to defend well. They take 
two electives – anything from reverse engineering and digital forensics to a Cyber 




3. NPS Panelist 2 
Sharon Runde: NPS was asked to create a Cyber 101 course that All-Hands Navy 
would take. We wanted to put together a course that will give every student a 
fundamental, baseline understanding of what Cyber is. 
We started with 17 people teaching the “All-Hands” course. The key topic areas 
were laid out to create a “Cyber turn of mind.” We aren’t analog or even digital anymore. 
Learning objectives were defined and refined to align with NWC, NPS, and 
USNA. As our organizations are all part of the Navy, we wanted to make sure that we are 
all focusing on the same areas of interest and concern. One challenge was how to 
organize such a course. Options included: 
1) Covering core topics and then branching out. 
2) A fish-bone organization (this becomes extremely labor intensive for 
administration). 
3) A true all-hands approach with few opt-outs. 
Another challenge is fitting this new mandatory course into an already full 
curricula. Right now it is an elective, but there will eventually be a directive from 
OPNAV and N2/N6 making it mandatory. 
The most important thing we want to accomplish is ensuring every student that 
walks out of NPS understands what Cyber is and how it impacts their job, as well as their 
counterparts’ jobs. We also have a strong focus on each topic area being operationally 
relevant.  
A lesson learned from the pilot is class control to keep certain students from 
taking over the sessions. At the beginning we also started teaching the course very 




4. Audience Comments/Questions/Discussion 
An audience member stated that only 2-4 out of 20 freshman knew anything about 
Cyber other than their phone, and that there is a program called Cyber Patriot which last 
year had 6000 teams from across the US enter. The Academies have criteria that 
determine which plebes are nominated. Perhaps one of those criteria should be 
participation in a team. 
The panel pointed out that it may be possible to find a great hacker that isn’t on 
any kind of team – maybe we “blue chip” a hacker. We may not be reaching recruitable 
individuals. Ideally we would reach them around 16-17 years old and ask them if they 
have heard of cyber. The UK did a survey found that girls were turned off by Cyber by 
the age of 13-14 because no-one encouraged them to keep coding or being involved.  
A comment regarding the intro class was that his class is online and the intro is 
one that the students get without competition between technically and non-technically 
savvy people. Students completed the content on-line and then came together face-to-
face.  
Another audience member completely agreed with the change to focus on Cyber. 
The goal has been to produce officers to fight the war. Slide rules can’t be the norm 
anymore. The battlefield now includes cyberspace. While we still need people on the 
ground, the physical space is only part of it. To fight the Cyber war we need the 
education in the academies.  
The panel responded by stating that West Point is also now accepting 30 students 
into a new Cyber Military Occupational Specialty, who will progress faster since they 
have their own MOS. West Point has a typical URL restriction. Of everyone that did a 
direct accession, 20 of the top 350 students were accepted. These students came from CS, 
ECE, Physics, Math, etc. These backgrounds directly relate to the likelihood of being 
successful in the cryptologic and Cyber battlespace. The flexibility of establishing a 
Cyber department has afforded them the opportunity to offer more to students. USNA, on 
the other hand, is incredibly demanding and they are limited in what they can do, but 
what they still want is to imbue students with a lot of things such as Cyber psychology – 
if there’s a bad guy, why is the adversary doing what they’re doing? Sometimes it’s 
obvious, but many times you can’t tell why adversaries do what they do. It will change 
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the way students think about what they are operationally doing in this Cyber space. 50 
out of 1050 is still a small fraction of student becoming Cyber experts. We now have 
‘flying vulnerabilities’ because everything is networked. 
An audience member then pointed out that nuclear students have to understand 
how every piece of the ship works before they get their “dolphins”. Due to the increasing 
incorporation of Cyber systems and concepts in all aspects of the Navy, it makes sense to 
move Cyber to the forefront of all students’ education, or it will master you before you 
master it. 
The panel stated that Cyber hygiene was a key tenet, and that teaching these life 
lessons is really critical. The goal is that everyone in the Navy should have a fundamental 
understanding of Cyber hygiene, but what else is needed? The problem space will keep 
growing because everyone else also has the same fundamental understanding. Students 
need to understand that even they can be an unwitting adversary. 
Another audience member mentioned professional certification tracks. These 
bring not just the content, but get students to look at getting certifications. For example, 
CISSP forces the student to think beyond the box. 
The panel said that outsiders have said they could take the CISSP exam at the end 
of the USNA classes. The Navy currently doesn’t pay for certifications, but they have 
thought about it. One difficulty facing educators is how to keep up and keep content fresh 
without having to change an entire curriculum? Staying current in this field is very 
challenging. The difference between “education” and “training” is important here as well. 
Professional certifications are great, but they focus on current systems and requirements 
and become obsolete over time. Done correctly, education develops critical thinking 
skills that remain relevant even as technologies, tactics, and adversaries evolve. 
At NPS, the courses are current because our curriculum is taught at the TS/SCI 
level and we interact with our sponsors to see what they are concerned about so that those 
in-time concerns can be addressed in the classroom. Also, since we do research, the 
faculty is on the leading edge of the Cyber domain. The curriculum is also informed and 
driven by their research and is implicitly kept up to date.  
One audience member found it interesting that Cyber is interdisciplinary and both 
courses described were ‘survey-ish’ in nature and were done before the students were 
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grounded in their disciplines. The member asked if there were any consequences of doing 
that, any observations, and what could the students get out of it if the courses were taken 
early in their matrix? 
The panel stated that NPS has gone back and forth, and that there is no definitive 
answer. On one side, the course is broad and doesn’t go deep and gives an overview of 
what to expect later. On the other side, if the students have some cyber/computer classes 
first then they will have an appreciation for the material. It may not matter when they 
take the class, but if taken early they move together as a cohort. Since the course is 
intended for “all hands” and supports curricula that may have no other Cyber content, its 
placement in some matrices is largely arbitrary. 
For USNA, the midshipmen take 90 credits as core, while the plebe course is 
extra. The course fit best in their freshman year. Some people don’t believe Cyber is 
interdisciplinary which politically makes it difficult to implement, but offering the class 
early gives them the opportunity to take something rooted in logic, even if it isn’t very 
technical. It has benefited midshipmen because they transition into their classes having 
had the opportunity to have logical, technical thinking. If other states follow Mississippi’s 
example and increase STEM at the high school level, USNA’s curriculum can be 
adjusted accordingly. 
An audience member pointed out that we don’t need a bunch of programmers. 
What USNA and NPS have in common is that we are training officers. Dr. Hamming said 
we are training officers and then we are training scholars. Having the Hopper Hall, 
USNA’s new Cyber building is a wonderful thing. 
The panel noted that the Hopper Hall will have classified spaces and the entire 
Cyber department as well as seven majors will be co-located in the building. It would be 
great to have a SCADA lab but the panel is not sure if that is feasible yet. Currently, 
everything is scattered across campus in different buildings. Having everything in one 
building will encourage collaboration among different departments. We have an 
invitation to visit the new building, and the USNA is trying to push more project based 
learning. 
Finally, an audience member asked how attendees of the Workshop could help the 
general population learn more about computer science. CS has changed and evolved over 
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time. Berkeley also has a college that teaches CS. Should educators plan to integrate new 
objectives for cyberspace into the curriculum? 
The panel stated that in order to cultivate talent, we should draw from the larger 





We are convinced an urgent national need exists to provide Cyber systems/secure 
software-intensive systems that operate dependably in today’s contested computing 
environments. Given the state of industry, there are obvious challenges to fully secure 
functioning Cyber systems. These challenges include the development of a standardized 
and relevant Cyber curriculum as well as a deeper understanding of how emerging AI and 
machine learning techniques can be leveraged to weaken or strengthen a Cyber system. 
Cyber researchers and developers are making progress on solving various aspects of the 
problem, but much remains to be done.  
A. SUMMARY 
The 20th Monterey Workshop on Cyber was held at the Naval Postgraduate 
School in Monterey, CA, on Nov. 27-29, 2018. The NPS Provost, Cyber Academic 
Group Chair and Dean of Research co-chaired the workshop and led the program 
committee with members from all NPS schools and departments. The program consisted 
of five unclassified sessions, two panels, and one classified session. The presentations 
addressed Cyber problems associated with unmanned/autonomous vehicles, Cyber 
challenges of Naval Operations, Cyber fundamentals, AI/machine learning, insider 
threats and command and control. The workshop program in section I.C has details. 
Following traditions of past Monterey Workshops, participants from universities, 
industry and government were present and worked together to achieve consensus on how 
to best satisfy urgent national needs. 
The first of the two workshop panels discussed establishment of the Monterey 
Cyber Institute. In the second panel on Cyber Education, panelists and attendees 
exchanged curriculum related concepts and shared teaching experiences from Cyber 
education programs at the Naval Postgraduate School, the U.S. Naval Academy, and the 
University of Texas at San Antonio. These institutions host some of the largest Cyber 
education programs in the country, with more than 4,500 students. 
The workshop concluded Cyber education will benefit from a unified vision and 
standardization. Institutions have different, sometimes conflicting views of what kind of 
preparation Cyber professionals need. These differences have to be reconciled, aligned 
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with the needs of the Cyber community, and implemented at educational institutions. 
There are accreditation bodies currently addressing these issues, but it is likely to take 
time for this process to converge on a community consensus. These recommendations 
were later re-affirmed by a recent Executive Order, reproduced in Appendix A. 
Additionally, the panel determined Cyber professionals need both theoretical 
understanding and hands-on experience with Cyber operations and related tools. 
Simulated Cyber environments also have a critically important role in Cyber education 
and training. 
The workshop recognized current and potential contributions of AI and machine 
learning to Cyber operations. These include both defensive applications, such as early 
intrusion detection, and offensive, such as automated harvesting of information leaked 
through network traffic. Cyber test facilities were described, including some that already 
have massive and growing datasets available, particularly with respect to autonomous 
vehicles. These datasets aim to support new applications of machine learning that 
integrate both Cyber and physical systems. Availability of data is an enabling factor for 
progress, since ample storage and processing capabilities of the type needed for applying 
machine learning are readily available [90]. 
A great deal of discussion occurred relating to verifying the accuracy and security 
of decision aids and autonomous subsystems. Multiple approaches were presented, see 
Chapter II for details. It was pointed out that due to the low cost of entry, Cyber threats 
related to autonomous vehicles are rapidly evolving and that counter-measures must 
evolve rapidly to keep up. This puts a premium on balancing risks – delay in deploying 
solutions may introduce as much risk exposure as deploying imperfect solutions rapidly. 
Another theme that emerged was how to mitigate risk posed by insider threats without 
alienating the loyal and conscientious majority of the Cyber workforce via intrusive 
surveillance. 
As illustrated by the recent renaming of the Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
Command’s Systems Centers (SSC-Pacific and SSC-Atlantic) to Naval Information 
Warfare Centers (NIWC-Pacific and NIWC-Atlantic), the proliferation of Cyber systems 
through all aspects of the military has propelled Cyber issues to the highest research 
priorities, as well solidifying their place in modern C4I - Command, Control, 
 
161 
Communications, Computers & Intelligence. In order to ensure the Navy’s continued 
dominance of the world’s oceans, researchers must help the Navy identify, develop, 
deliver, and sustain information warfighting capabilities to ensure freedom of action 
across all warfighting domains in, through, and from cyberspace, and to deny the same to 
the Navy's adversaries. This is dependent on the provision of Cyber systems that can 
operate dependably in contested environments. The Defense Information Systems 
Agency is addressing one aspect of this by developing capabilities for continuous 
assurance of user identity on mobile devices by monitoring multi-factor biometrics [91]. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
Secure communications are of vital importance in all aspects of life, and 
especially so in a military context. During World War II, computer scientist Alan Turing 
devised a number of techniques for speeding the breaking of German ciphers, including 
improvements to the pre-war Polish bombe method, an electromechanical machine that 
could find settings for the Enigma machine [69]. It has been estimated that this 
contribution shortened the war by two years and saved 14 million lives [70] [71]. Now 
network communication is a critical part of the infrastructure supporting our economy, 
our daily lives, and national security. Diverse communication infrastructure – cabled, 
wireless and optical – has been deployed from the sea floor to the land, air and space [72] 
[73]. Personal communication, commercial coordination, and internet of things depend 
on it, as well as military C4I and undersea communications [74]. Communications are a 
key aspect of tomorrow’s technology-led battlefields, as recognized in the recent 
Executive Orders issued by the White House on May 2 and 15, 2019 [75] [76]. These are 
reproduced in Appendices A and B, respectively. 
In these Executive Orders, the President unequivocally made cybersecurity his 
priority. The Executive Order dated May 15, 2019 was titled Securing the Information 
and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain. This order called for 
increased vigilance with regard to the potential of foreign adversary contamination of the 
information and communication technology supply chain. While this order does not 
directly relate to NPS or USNA programs, it does increase the demand for Cyber savvy 
personnel. This demand is reinforced and partially addressed by the Executive Order 
dated May 2, 2019. 
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This Executive Order was titled America’s Cybersecurity Workforce, and 
provided a mandate for USNA and NPS products and services. The Order acknowledges 
America’s Cybersecurity Workforce as a crucial element in preserving peace and 
continuing prosperity, saying, “America’s cybersecurity workforce is a strategic asset that 
protects the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life.” The Order 
also acknowledged that the Cyber workforce is not where it needs to be. The President 
required the development of an annual cybersecurity competition to be held between all 
Federal cybersecurity employees, as well as an annual Presidential Cybersecurity 
Education Award to recognize the best elementary and secondary school educators. 
Educational institutions not affiliated with the Federal government should mirror these 
efforts to enhance the nation’s cybersecurity workforce. In addition to increasing 
workforce mobility and incentivizing top performers, the Order called for improving 
access to training and increasing innovation. The Monterey Workshop discussed 
precisely these topics. 
Communication has always been vulnerable, historically to jamming and 
interception, and now to many other disruptions, including Cyber effects. Current 
communication modes need better protection, and we need to address emerging new 
options for networked communications, such as 5G wireless, software-defined radios, 
software-defined networking, quantum technologies, and others yet to be developed, such 
as adaptive short-wave radio for over-the-horizon wireless networking. Making our 
networked communications reliable, robust and secure is one of the most important goals 
for the Cyber community as new capabilities spread and introduce new vulnerabilities in 
information and communication technology and services. This is a necessary step in 
carrying out the third offset strategy for national security, whose goal is to make humans 
more effective in combat [89]. 
As stated by former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, “It is now undeniable that 
the homeland is no longer a sanctuary” [77]. The increasing cyber-connectedness of the 
modern world has enabled adversaries to target the confidence and social cohesion of a 
population and its political processes without ever physically crossing its borders [78]. 
This new threat vector makes cybersecurity vital to safeguarding not just the nation’s 
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military and industrial infrastructure and processes, but also the very core of our society 
[79]. 
Data science is a “multi-disciplinary field that uses scientific methods, algorithms 
and systems to extract knowledge and insights for structured and unstructured data” [92]. 
Current trends are to process large amounts of data to derive statistical conclusions for 
use in decision making. However, commercial use of the term “Artificial Intelligence” for 
this activity may be dangerously misleading, because current popular applications of 
machine learning are not intelligent in the human sense [80]. They are not aware of risks 
associated with outcomes of their decisions, and operate by seeking to minimize the error 
rate without distinguishing between trivial errors and those with catastrophic 
consequences. They also do not consider whether or not derived statistical correlations 
correspond to cause-effect relationships and whether or not they would be reliable guides 
for planning future actions. The inclusion of human operators in the decision-making 
loop will thus be necessary in the near to mid-term, and further improvements in use of 
man-machine teaming to reduce residual risks of using machine learning should be 
pursued. 
The success of Cyber operations depends on high-quality software that must be 
agile and intelligent, with intelligence instilled in the software. Well-engineered software 
is also needed for software-defined radios that adaptively choose frequencies to 
circumvent environmental factors with jamming attempts, software-defined networks that 
dynamically and programmatically alter their configurations in order to monitor networks 
and improve their performance [19], communications technology and services [81], 
control systems for satellites, medical devices [82], or weapons systems [83], and many 
other applications. 
The ability of a system to operate in all situations is critical to Cyber operations. 
Reliability is challenging for systems that can learn and adapt [84]. The system behavior 
can be modified, updated, and advanced during operation while its operational context is 
affected by external factors. In the case of the recent Boeing 737 MAX groundings, a 
failed sensor incorrectly altered the system’s operational context and caused two planes 
to crash [85]. If the control system could learn and adapt as an intelligent, adaptive 
system, it could compensate for such failures. 
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The Proceedings of the 20th Monterey Workshop is available through the NPS 
Library. The workshop series has discussed many topics and has guided directions taken 
by research sponsors including the Army Research Office, National Science Foundation, 
Office of Naval Research, Air Force Office of Sponsored Research, Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency, and other organizations. The past Monterey Workshops 
proceedings are available on the websites of various sponsoring organizations, which can 
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APPENDIX A: EXECUTIVE ORDER 5/2/2019 
AMERICA’S CYBERSECURITY WORKFORCE 
 
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the 
United States of America, and to better ensure continued American economic prosperity 
and national security, it is hereby ordered as follows: 
Section 1. Policy. (a) America’s cybersecurity workforce is a strategic asset that 
protects the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life. The National 
Cyber Strategy, the President’s 2018 Management Agenda, and Executive Order 13800 
of May 11, 2017 (Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical 
Infrastructure), each emphasize that a superior cybersecurity workforce will promote 
American prosperity and preserve peace. America’s cybersecurity workforce is a diverse 
group of practitioners who govern, design, defend, analyze, administer, operate, and 
maintain the data, systems, and networks on which our economy and way of life depend. 
Whether they are employed in the public or private sectors, they are guardians of our 
national and economic security. 
b) The United States Government must enhance the workforce mobility of 
America’s cybersecurity practitioners to improve America’s national cybersecurity. 
During their careers, America’s cybersecurity practitioners will serve in various roles for 
multiple and diverse entities. United States Government policy must facilitate the 
seamless movement of cybersecurity practitioners between the public and private sectors, 
maximizing the contributions made by their diverse skills, experiences, and talents to our 
Nation. 
(c) The United States Government must support the development of cybersecurity 
skills and encourage ever-greater excellence so that America can maintain its competitive 
edge in cybersecurity. The United States Government must also recognize and reward the 
country’s highest-performing cybersecurity practitioners and teams. 
(d) The United States Government must create the organizational and 
technological tools required to maximize the cybersecurity talents and capabilities of 
American workers –-especially when those talents and capabilities can advance our 
national and economic security. The Nation is experiencing a shortage of cybersecurity 
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talent and capability, and innovative approaches are required to improve access to 
training that maximizes individuals’ cybersecurity knowledge, skills, and abilities. 
Training opportunities, such as work-based learning, apprenticeships, and blended 
learning approaches, must be enhanced for both new workforce entrants and those who 
are advanced in their careers. 
(e) In accordance with Executive Order 13800, the President will continue to hold 
heads of executive departments and agencies (agencies) accountable for managing 
cybersecurity risk to their enterprises, which includes ensuring the effectiveness of their 
cybersecurity workforces. 
Sec. 2. Strengthening the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce. (a) To grow the 
cybersecurity capability of the United States Government, increase integration of the 
Federal cybersecurity workforce, and strengthen the skills of Federal information 
technology and cybersecurity practitioners, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the 
Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), shall establish a cybersecurity 
rotational assignment program, which will serve as a mechanism for knowledge transfer 
and a development program for cybersecurity practitioners. Within 90 days of the date of 
this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Directors of 
OMB and OPM, shall provide a report to the President that describes the proposed 
program, identifies its resource implications, and recommends actions required for its 
implementation. The report shall evaluate how to achieve the following objectives, to the 
extent permitted by applicable law, as part of the program: 
(i) The non-reimbursable detail of information technology and 
cybersecurity employees, who are nominated by their employing agencies, to 
serve at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); 
(ii) The non-reimbursable detail of experienced cybersecurity DHS 
employees to other agencies to assist in improving those agencies’ cybersecurity 
risk management; 
(iii) The use of the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education 
Cybersecurity Workforce Framework (NICE Framework) as the basis for 
cybersecurity skill requirements for program participants; 
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(iv) The provision of training curricula and expansion of learning 
experiences to develop participants’ skill levels; and 
(v) Peer mentoring to enhance workforce integration. 
(b) Consistent with applicable law and to the maximum extent practicable, the 
Administrator of General Services, in consultation with the Director of OMB and the 
Secretary of Commerce, shall: 
(i) Incorporate the NICE Framework lexicon and taxonomy into 
workforce knowledge and skill requirements used in contracts for information 
technology and cybersecurity services; 
(ii) Ensure that contracts for information technology and cybersecurity 
services include reporting requirements that will enable agencies to evaluate 
whether personnel have the necessary knowledge and skills to perform the tasks 
specified in the contract, consistent with the NICE Framework; and 
(iii) Provide a report to the President, within 1 year of the date of this 
order, that describes how the NICE Framework has been incorporated into 
contracts for information technology and cybersecurity services, evaluates the 
effectiveness of this approach in improving services provided to the United States 
Government, and makes recommendations to increase the effective use of the 
NICE Framework by United States Government contractors. 
(c) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Director of OPM, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the heads of 
other agencies as appropriate, shall identify a list of cybersecurity aptitude assessments 
for agencies to use in identifying current employees with the potential to acquire 
cybersecurity skills for placement in reskilling programs to perform cybersecurity work. 
Agencies shall incorporate one or more of these assessments into their personnel 
development programs, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law. 
(d) Agencies shall ensure that existing awards and decorations for the uniformed 
services and civilian personnel recognize performance and achievements in the areas of 
cybersecurity and cyber-operations, including by ensuring the availability of awards and 
decorations equivalent to citations issued pursuant to Executive Order 10694 of January 
10, 1957 (Authorizing the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force To Issue 
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Citations in the Name of the President of the United States to Military and Naval Units 
for Outstanding Performance in Action), as amended. Where necessary and appropriate, 
agencies shall establish new awards and decorations to recognize performance and 
achievements in the areas of cybersecurity and cyber-operations. The Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs may recommend to agencies that any Cyber 
unified coordination group or similar ad hoc interagency group that has addressed a 
significant cybersecurity or cyber-operations-related national security crisis, incident, or 
effort be recognized for appropriate awards and decorations. 
(e) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of 
Defense, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Director of 
OMB, and the heads of other appropriate agencies, shall develop a plan for an annual 
cybersecurity competition (President’s Cup Cybersecurity Competition) for Federal 
civilian and military employees. The goal of the competition shall be to identify, 
challenge, and reward the United States Government’s best cybersecurity practitioners 
and teams across offensive and defensive cybersecurity disciplines. The plan shall be 
submitted to the President within 90 days of the date of this order. The first competition 
shall be held no later than December 31, 2019, and annually thereafter. The plan for the 
competition shall address the following: 
(i) The challenges and benefits of inviting advisers, participants, or 
observers from non-Federal entities to observe or take part in the competition and 
recommendations for including them in future competitions, as appropriate; 
(ii) How the Department of Energy, through the National Laboratories, in 
consultation with the Administrator of the United States Digital Service, can 
provide expert technical advice and assistance to support the competition, as 
appropriate; 
(iii) The parameters for the competition, including the development of 
multiple individual and team events that test cybersecurity skills related to the 
NICE Framework and other relevant skills, as appropriate. These parameters 
should include competition categories involving individual and team events, 
software reverse engineering and exploitation, network operations, forensics, big 
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data analysis, Cyber analysis, Cyber defense, Cyber exploitation, secure 
programming, obfuscated coding, cyber-physical systems, and other disciplines; 
(iv) How to encourage agencies to select their best cybersecurity 
practitioners as individual and team participants. Such practitioners should 
include Federal employees and uniformed services personnel from Federal 
civilian agencies, as well as Department of Defense active duty military 
personnel, civilians, and those serving in a drilling reserve capacity in the Armed 
Forces Reserves or National Guard; 
(v) The extent to which agencies, as well as uniformed services, may 
develop a President’s Cup awards program that is consistent with applicable law 
and regulations governing awards and that allows for the provision of cash awards 
of not less than $25,000. Any such program shall require the agency to establish 
an awards program before allowing its employees to participate in the President’s 
Cup Cybersecurity Competition. In addition, any such program may not preclude 
agencies from recognizing winning and non-winning participants through other 
means, including honorary awards, informal recognition awards, rating-based 
cash awards, time-off awards, Quality Step Increases, or other agency-based 
compensation flexibilities as appropriate and consistent with applicable law; and 
(vi) How the uniformed services, as appropriate and consistent with 
applicable law, may designate service members who win these competitions as 
having skills at a time when there is a critical shortage of such skills within the 
uniformed services. The plan should also address how the uniformed services may 
provide winning service members with a combination of bonuses, advancements, 
and meritorious recognition to be determined by the Secretaries of the agencies 
concerned. 
(f) The Director of OMB shall, in consultation with appropriate agencies, develop 
annually a list of agencies and subdivisions related to cybersecurity that have a primary 
function of intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative, or national security work, 
including descriptions of such functions. The Director of OMB shall provide this list to 
the President, through the Deputy Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism (DAPHSCT), every year starting September 1, 2019, for consideration 
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of whether those agencies or subdivisions should be exempted from coverage under the 
Federal Labor-Management Relations Program, consistent with the requirements of 
section 7103(b)(1) of title 5, United States Code. 
Sec. 3. Strengthening the Nation’s Cybersecurity Workforce. (a) The Secretary of 
Commerce and the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretaries), in coordination with 
the Secretary of Education and the heads of other agencies as the Secretaries determine is 
appropriate, shall execute, consistent with applicable law and to the greatest extent 
practicable, the recommendations from the report to the President on Supporting the 
Growth and Sustainment of the Nation’s Cybersecurity Workforce (Workforce Report) 
developed pursuant to Executive Order 13800. The Secretaries shall develop a 
consultative process that includes Federal, State, territorial, local, and tribal governments, 
academia, private-sector stakeholders, and other relevant partners to assess and make 
recommendations to address national cybersecurity workforce needs and to ensure greater 
mobility in the American cybersecurity workforce. To fulfill the Workforce Report’s 
vision of preparing, growing, and sustaining a national cybersecurity workforce that 
safeguards and promotes America’s national security and economic prosperity, priority 
consideration will be given to the following imperatives: 
(i) To launch a national Call to Action to draw attention to and mobilize 
public- and private-sector resources to address cybersecurity workforce needs; 
(ii) To transform, elevate, and sustain the cybersecurity learning 
environment to grow a dynamic and diverse cybersecurity workforce; 
(iii) To align education and training with employers’ cybersecurity 
workforce needs, improve coordination, and prepare individuals for lifelong 
careers; and 
(iv) To establish and use measures that demonstrate the effectiveness and 
impact of cybersecurity workforce investments. 
(b) To strengthen the ability of the Nation to identify and mitigate cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure and defense systems, particularly cyber-physical 
systems for which safety and reliability depend on secure control systems, the Secretary 
of Defense, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Energy, and the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, in coordination with the Director of OPM and the Secretary of 
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Labor, shall provide a report to the President, through the DAPHSCT, within 180 days of 
the date of this order that: 
(i) Identifies and evaluates skills gaps in Federal and non-Federal 
cybersecurity personnel and training gaps for specific critical infrastructure 
sectors, defense critical infrastructure, and the Department of Defense’s platform 
information technologies; and 
(ii) Recommends curricula for closing the identified skills gaps for Federal 
personnel and steps the United States Government can take to close such gaps for 
non-Federal personnel by, for example, supporting the development of similar 
curricula by education or training providers. 
(c) Within 1 year of the date of this order, the Secretary of Education, in 
consultation with the DAPHSCT and the National Science Foundation, shall develop and 
implement, consistent with applicable law, an annual Presidential Cybersecurity 
Education Award to be presented to one elementary and one secondary school educator 
per year who best instill skills, knowledge, and passion with respect to cybersecurity and 
cybersecurity-related subjects. In developing and implementing this award, the Secretary 
of Education shall emphasize demonstrated superior educator accomplishment — without 
respect to research, scholarship, or technology development — as well as academic 
achievement by the educator’s students. 
(d) The Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of 
Education, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the heads of other appropriate 
agencies shall encourage the voluntary integration of the NICE Framework into existing 
education, training, and workforce development efforts undertaken by State, territorial, 
local, tribal, academic, non‑profit, and private-sector entities, consistent with applicable 
law. The Secretary of Commerce shall provide annual updates to the President regarding 
effective uses of the NICE Framework by non-Federal entities and make 
recommendations for improving the application of the NICE Framework in cybersecurity 
education, training, and workforce development. 
Sec. 4. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair 
or otherwise affect: 
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(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or 
the head thereof; or 
(ii) the functions of the Director of OMB relating to budgetary, 
administrative, or legislative proposals. 
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to 
the availability of appropriations. 
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, 
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United 
States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any 
other person. 
DONALD J. TRUMP 
THE WHITE HOUSE, 
May 2, 2019. 
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APPENDIX B: EXECUTIVE ORDER 5/15/2019 
SECURING THE INFORMATION AND COMMMNUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY 
AND SERVICES SUPPLY CHAIN 
 
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the 
United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et 
seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, 
I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, find that 
foreign adversaries are increasingly creating and exploiting vulnerabilities in information 
and communications technology and services, which store and communicate vast 
amounts of sensitive information, facilitate the digital economy, and support critical 
infrastructure and vital emergency services, in order to commit malicious cyber-enabled 
actions, including economic and industrial espionage against the United States and its 
people. I further find that the unrestricted acquisition or use in the United States of 
information and communications technology or services designed, developed, 
manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the 
jurisdiction or direction of foreign adversaries augments the ability of foreign adversaries 
to create and exploit vulnerabilities in information and communications technology or 
services, with potentially catastrophic effects, and thereby constitutes an unusual and 
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United 
States. This threat exists both in the case of individual acquisitions or uses of such 
technology or services, and when acquisitions or uses of such technologies are considered 
as a class. Although maintaining an open investment climate in information and 
communications technology, and in the United States economy more generally, is 
important for the overall growth and prosperity of the United States, such openness must 
be balanced by the need to protect our country against critical national security threats. 
To deal with this threat, additional steps are required to protect the security, integrity, and 
reliability of information and communications technology and services provided and used 
in the United States. In light of these findings, I hereby declare a national emergency with 
respect to this threat. 
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Accordingly, it is hereby ordered as follows: 
Section 1. Implementation. (a) The following actions are prohibited: any 
acquisition, importation, transfer, installation, dealing in, or use of any information and 
communications technology or service (transaction) by any person, or with respect to any 
property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, where the transaction involves 
any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest 
(including through an interest in a contract for the provision of the technology or service), 
where the transaction was initiated, is pending, or will be completed after the date of this 
order, and where the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary), in consultation with the 
Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney 
General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the United States Trade Representative, the 
Director of National Intelligence, the Administrator of General Services, the Chairman of 
the Federal Communications Commission, and, as appropriate, the heads of other 
executive departments and agencies (agencies), has determined that: 
(i) the transaction involves information and communications technology or 
services designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied, by persons owned by, 
controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary; and 
(ii) the transaction: 
(A) poses an undue risk of sabotage to or subversion of the design, 
integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, operation, 
or maintenance of information and communications technology or services 
in the United States; 
(B) poses an undue risk of catastrophic effects on the security or 
resiliency of United States critical infrastructure or the digital economy of 
the United States; or 
(C) otherwise poses an unacceptable risk to the national security of 
the United States or the security and safety of United States persons. 
(b) The Secretary, in consultation with the heads of other agencies as appropriate, 
may at the Secretary’s discretion design or negotiate measures to mitigate concerns 
identified under section 1(a) of this order. Such measures may serve as a precondition to 
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the approval of a transaction or of a class of transactions that would otherwise be 
prohibited pursuant to this order. 
(c) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply except to the extent 
provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued 
pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or 
permit granted prior to the effective date of this order. 
Sec. 2. Authorities. (a) The Secretary, in consultation with, or upon referral of a 
particular transaction from, the heads of other agencies as appropriate, is hereby 
authorized to take such actions, including directing the timing and manner of the 
cessation of transactions prohibited pursuant to section 1 of this order, adopting 
appropriate rules and regulations, and employing all other powers granted to the 
President by IEEPA, as may be necessary to implement this order. All agencies of the 
United States Government are directed to take all appropriate measures within their 
authority to carry out the provisions of this order. 
(b) Rules and regulations issued pursuant to this order may, among other things, 
determine that particular countries or persons are foreign adversaries for the purposes of 
this order; identify persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or 
direction of foreign adversaries for the purposes of this order; identify particular 
technologies or countries with respect to which transactions involving information and 
communications technology or services warrant particular scrutiny under the provisions 
of this order; establish procedures to license transactions otherwise prohibited pursuant to 
this order; establish criteria, consistent with section 1 of this order, by which particular 
technologies or particular participants in the market for information and communications 
technology or services may be recognized as categorically included in or as categorically 
excluded from the prohibitions established by this order; and identify a mechanism and 
relevant factors for the negotiation of agreements to mitigate concerns raised in 
connection with subsection 1(a) of this order. Within 150 days of the date of this order, 
the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of State, the 
Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the 
United States Trade Representative, the Director of National Intelligence, the 
Administrator of General Services, the Chairman of the Federal Communications 
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Commission and, as appropriate, the heads of other agencies, shall publish rules or 
regulations implementing the authorities delegated to the Secretary by this order. 
(c) The Secretary may, consistent with applicable law, redelegate any of the 
authorities conferred on the Secretary pursuant to this section within the Department of 
Commerce. 
Sec. 3. Definitions. For purposes of this order: 
(a) the term “entity” means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, 
corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization; 
(b) the term “foreign adversary” means any foreign government or foreign non-
government person engaged in a long‑term pattern or serious instances of conduct 
significantly adverse to the national security of the United States or security and safety of 
United States persons; 
(c) the term “information and communications technology or services” means any 
hardware, software, or other product or service primarily intended to fulfill or enable the 
function of information or data processing, storage, retrieval, or communication by 
electronic means, including transmission, storage, and display; 
(d) the term “person” means an individual or entity; and 
(e) the term “United States person” means any United States citizen, permanent 
resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction 
within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States. 
Sec. 4. Recurring and Final Reports to the Congress. The Secretary, in 
consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to submit recurring and 
final reports to the Congress on the national emergency declared in this order, consistent 
with section 401(c) of the NEA (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)) and section 204(c) of IEEPA (50 
U.S.C. 1703(c)). 
Sec. 5. Assessments and Reports. (a) The Director of National Intelligence shall 
continue to assess threats to the United States and its people from information and 
communications technology or services designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied 
by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign 
adversary. The Director of National Intelligence shall produce periodic written 
assessments of these threats in consultation with the heads of relevant agencies, and shall 
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provide these assessments to the President, the Secretary for the Secretary’s use in 
connection with his responsibilities pursuant to this order, and the heads of other agencies 
as appropriate. An initial assessment shall be completed within 40 days of the date of this 
order, and further assessments shall be completed at least annually, and shall include 
analysis of: 
(i) threats enabled by information and communications technologies or 
services designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, 
controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary; and 
(ii) threats to the United States Government, United States critical 
infrastructure, and United States entities from information and communications 
technologies or services designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by 
persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the influence of a foreign 
adversary. 
(b) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall continue to assess and identify 
entities, hardware, software, and services that present vulnerabilities in the United States 
and that pose the greatest potential consequences to the national security of the United 
States. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with sector-specific agencies 
and coordinating councils as appropriate, shall produce a written assessment within 80 
days of the date of this order, and annually thereafter. This assessment shall include an 
evaluation of hardware, software, or services that are relied upon by multiple information 
and communications technology or service providers, including the communication 
services relied upon by critical infrastructure entities identified pursuant to section 9 of 
Executive Order 13636 of February 12, 2013 (Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity). 
(c) Within 1 year of the date of this order, and annually thereafter, the Secretary, 
in consultation as appropriate with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, 
the United States Trade Representative, the Director of National Intelligence, and the 
Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, shall assess and report to the 
President whether the actions taken by the Secretary pursuant to this order are sufficient 
and continue to be necessary to mitigate the risks identified in, and pursuant to, this order. 
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Sec. 6. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair 
or otherwise affect: 
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or 
the head thereof; or 
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals. 
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to 
the availability of appropriations. 
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, 
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United 
States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any 
other person. 
DONALD J. TRUMP 
THE WHITE HOUSE, 
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